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TAX EROSION AND THE "BOOTSTRAP SALE"
OF A BUSINESS-II
GEoFmmY J. LANimi t
Part I of this Article contained an analysis of the doctrines of the "boot-
strap" sale as they relate to the increasing erosion of our democatic system
of progressive taxation. Part II will be devoted to a detailed consideration
of the most recent and most complicated form of bootstrap transfer, the "loss
bootstrap;" and to general conclusions regarding the process of tax erosion
exemplified by bootstrap sales.
IX. THE Loss BOOTSTRAP TRANSFERS
The Nature of the Loss Bootstrap
Analyzed in Part I were the three "charitable bootstraps": the
"original" bootstraps which include the only litigated cases; the "lease"
bootstraps which use a leasing technique to avoid certain statutory
limitations; and the "cemetery" bootstraps which utilize a nonprofit
cemetery as their source of tax exemption. It was inevitable that the
bootstrap technique be turned to similar employment in another area
of tax-free funds-net operating loss carryovers.318
The basic pattern of the loss bootstrap, particularly in its bootstrap
transfer of ownership, follows the format previously described. A
* Part I of this Article appeared in the March issue. Lanning, Tax Erosion and
the "Bootstrap Sale" of a Business-I, 108 U. PA. L. Rlv. 623 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Part I].
t Faculty, Law School, Yale University. A.B. 1939, LL.B. 1942, Harvard Uni-
versity. Formerly associated with the Office of the Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue
Service. The opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not purport to repre-
sent the U.S. Treasury.
318 See, e.g., Winton, Loss Corporations and Carry-Overs, 34 TAXEs 549, 554-55
(1956).
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group of promoters acquires effective control' 19 of an affiliated group
of corporations with large loss carryovers (Loss Group). After
liquidating its prior business activities, Loss Group sets up a new,
wholly owned and thinly capitalized subsidiary (New Company). New
Company then purchases a profitable business (Profit Company); even
though New Company has only a few thousand dollars in assets, it
negotiates the purchase of Profit Company for millions of dollars-an
inflated price reflecting the fact that New Company has no substantial
assets or other bargaining advantage except Loss Group's loss carry-
overs. The small down payment is taken out of the old profit business,
either directly, or indirectly by a pledge of its assets. The agreement
usually provides that seventy-five to eighty per cent of the pretax
profits of the business be paid to the former owners (Owners) of
Profit Company. until the agreed price is paid. In the meantime,
Owners receive management contracts and retain other significant
powers of control,32 ° such as the ability to recapture the business in the
event of default.
3 21
Finally Profit Company is affiliated in the filing of a consolidated
return with the members of Loss Group, and the latter's net operating
loss carryovers are thereby offset against the income of the former.
This technique is dependent upon a combination of loopholes, one
judicially created and legislatively perpetuated 22 and the other ad-
ministratively fashioned,3 23 in order to utilize a source of tax-exempt
funds, namely, the loss carryovers. Affiliation in a consolidated return,
as a tax planning technique, thus parallels the charitable "feeder," the
business "lease," and the "nonprofit" cemetery.
319 Acquiring 50% or more of the stock of the loss corporation might subject the
transaction to the limitations and disallowances of §§ 269 and 382(a) of the INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954. However, effective control may, except in unusual circumstances, be
secured without acquiring a full 50% of the stock.
320 Other powers of control are noted in the text accompanying note 324 infra.
3 2 3 The ability to recapture the business in case of default is a more significant
sign of retained control than is the case in the ordinary installment sale. This is due
to the far greater risk of recapture which results from the facts that the new corpo-
ration is thinly capitalized, that, as in Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37 (1956), aff'd,
254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958), the down payment is often taken directly from necessary
working capital, and frequently that a de facto inflated price is charged.
322 If a loss company acquires a profit company, rather than the latter purchasing
the former, judicial decisions to be considered at notes 373-81 infra and accompanying
text interpret § 129, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, added by ch. 63, § 128(a), 58 Stat 47
(1944) (now INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, §269) so as to permit the "peddling" of loss
carryovers. The 1954 revision of the Code perpetuates this problem.
323 Where a single loss company acquires a profit company, the former may not,
in a consolidated return, offset losses before affiliation against profits after affiliation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-31(b) (3) (1955). On the other hand, an administrative inter-
pretation of the regulations allows such an offset if the loss company previously had
one or more affiliated subsidiaries with whom it filed a consolidated return. See text
accompanying notes 441-50 infra.
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Owners may retain even greater control over the acquired business
in a loss bootstrap situation than with the charitable bootstraps. They
may be represented on the board of directors of New Company by as
much as fifty per cent of its membership; 324 they may acquire a
minority stock interest in Loss Companies as well as in New Company;
and they may retain a proxy to vote the stock of New Company or
Loss Companies, or both. In addition, they retain the entrepreneurial
risks. Inasmuch as Loss Group does not commit itself to pay the
price3 .5 and New Company is virtually penniless, there is no inde-
pendent purchaser with substantial assets to give reality to the com-
mitment to pay the "sales" price. And even if New Company had had
substantial assets, it would not have committed them as the agreements
expressly provide that the bulk of the payments are to be a percentage
of the income of the transferred business.326 In some loss bootstraps,
the "sales" price itself is not predetermined but rather varies with the
income of the profit business.
The inflated price32 7 in the loss bootstraps presents the same evi-
dentiary problems of valuation and "arm's length bargaining" as does
the charitable bootstrap. If hindsight is relevant to valuation,328 proof
that the price paid was inflated is difficult inasmuch as the continuing
economic boom has often resulted in the Profit Company having far
greater financial success than normal standards of valuation would have
indicated at the time of the transaction.
It is difficult to see that Owners have undergone the substantial
change in their position which is characteristic of a "sale." If the
324 See BOTANY MILLS' ANN. REP. 11 (1957).
325 BOTANY MILLS' ANN. REP. for 1957 points out that "our method of paying
for new acquisitions through use of the earnings of the company being purchased
has proved . . . satisfactory . . . . Each of the companies has been acquired with-
out using Botany assets or incurring Botany obligations. . . ." Id. at 2, 3.
326 As is emphasized in Part I at 637, the use in the lease bootstraps of an express
percentage agreement, where there are significant assets to be shielded from the
operating risks of the business, is the practical equivalent of the issuance in the
original bootstraps of notes guaranteeing a definite payment, by an entity with little
or no assets.
327 See Murphy, Sonnabend's Sackful, Fortune, Sept 1958, pp. 133, 135, where
the inflated prices paid in the Botany Mills transactions are noted. Botany purchased
Gurney Mills for $14 million, almost twice what anyone else would offer for them.
Most of the loss bootstraps involve what is an inflated price in fact, although, as in
the original bootstraps, this fact may be difficult to prove in court, particularly inas-
much as close corporations are often involved. Whether or not price inflation can be
proved, loss carryovers will not usually be purchased at their full tax value, inasmuch
as they must be discounted to reflect their being available primarily in the future and
to reflect the risks of not having income against which the carryovers may be offset;
therefore, even in the absence of a provable "windfall" price, the transferee is to
some extent benefited by another's loss carryovers. See notes 347-51 infra and accom-
panying text.
328 See Knapp Bros. Shoe Mfg. Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 899 (Ct. Cl.
1956) (fair market value of business determined in good part by its success after the
transaction).
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inflated price does not lead to Owners' recapture of the business,
eventually there will be a completed transfer of the business from them
to New Company and Loss Group. Until then, Owners will continue
to be the operating executives of the business and to receive its profits
at capital gains rates for a considerable number of years. The use of
net operating losses (which are attributable solely to the Loss Com-
panies) 329 to offset the income of Profit Company will enable Owners
to pocket th6se profits more surely, in greater amounts, and in a shorter
time than would be possible otherwise.
One claimed objective of the 1954 Code was to halt traffic in
"loss shells"--corporations whose primary economic value lies in their
accumulated net operating loss carryovers. 330 The bootstrap aspects of
these transactions appear to conflict with this policy: while in form
there appears to be a purchase by Loss Group of Profit Company, in
fact Owners retain such substantial ownership of it that they, and not
the Loss Group, derive the primary benefit from the carryovers. In
substance, Owners have purchased Loss Group's loss carryovers in
return for twenty to twenty-five per cent of the income of the business
and the possibility of Loss Group's acquiring ultimate ownership of
Profit Company. And if the price should prove so great a burden that
Owners recapture the business, they will have had the use of some of
Loss Group's carryovers at a cost of about twenty-five per cent of the
annual profits of the business.
Although Loss Group and New Company put up no money and
assume no obligations or risks, they, like Charity in the original boot-
strap cases, do not receive something for nothing. Loss Group and
New Company paid for their acquisition of Profit Company by making
available to Owners millions of dollars in net operating loss carryovers,
at what frequently is a "windfall" price. For example, if the fair
market value of Profit Company was $4,000,000 and the agreed price
was $9,000,000, Loss Group was in effect "selling" $5,000,000 of its
loss carryovers, and thereby giving Profit Company's Owners a wind-
fall. Loss Group has few assets and thus little bargaining power, but
does not complain inasmuch as it is trading its loss carryovers for the
ultimate ownership of the profit business. This appears to be the
329 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954) : "[a frequent abuse has been]
the purchase of the stock of a corporation with a history of losses for the purpose
of using its loss carryovers to offset gains of a business unrelated to that which
produced the losses." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954), states with
respect to the House version of §382 (rejected by the Senate) which reduced the
amount of the net operating loss carryover proportionately where 50% of the interest
in a closely held loss corporation was acquired by new owners: "[the loss carryover
is] a major tax benefit which has been abused through trafficking in corporations
with operating loss carryovers, the tax benefits of which are exploited by persons other
than those who incurred the loss."
330 Implementation of this objective was attempted in §§ 172, 269, 381 and 382.
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type of traffic in loss carryovers of which Congress has repeatedly dis-
approved,331 and the frequently excessive price, giving Owners the use
of Loss Group's carryovers at a windfall bargain, is but one more ob-
jection to these loss bootstrap transfers. 3
The final link in the structure of the loss bootstrap is supplied
when New Company, after its acquisition of Profit Company's stock,
files a consolidated return with Loss Group. New Company thereby
claims the right to offset the losses of the Loss Group against the un-
related postaffiliation income from the Profit Company business. The
filing of a consolidated return injects new issues into the problem. In
view of the substantial retention of ownership by the former owners of
the profit business, does New Company have sufficient "direct owner-
ship" 83 of Profit Company's stock to constitute the "affiliation" re-
quired to file a consolidated return? 134 Is the entire transaction such
as to rebut the presence of the "business purpose" necessary for affilia-
tion? And does the mere fact that a loss company had affiliated sub-
sidiaries prior to the acquisition of the profit business justify a use of
the losses of separate business enterprises-a use that the consolidated
return regulations would not otherwise permit?
The Major Issues Presented
The loss bootstrap cases present three major issues. First, how
far will a transfer be denied recognition as a "sale" for capital gains
and other tax purposes where the Owners retain most of their original
ownership rights? 3 5  Second, to what extent may net operating loss
carryovers be transferred among various business units and different
Owners? Third, to what extent are these first two issues affected by
the fact that they arise in the context of the filing of a consolidated re-
turn for an affiliated group of corporations?
331 See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954); H.R. REP No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954) ; S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, 58 (1943);
H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 49 (1943).332 The objections to "windfall dealings" are discussed in S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 39, 228 (1954); ALI, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAX
PROJECT-INCOME TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDFRS 41 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as 1958 ALI STUDY]; ALI, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE, AND GIFT
TAX STATUTE-INcomE TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE0LOERs 44, 47
(1957-58) [hereinafter cited as 1957-58 ALI REPORT]; Hearings on Advisory Group
Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code Before
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 876-77 (1959) [here-
inafter cited 1959 Advisory Group Hearings] (statement of S. H. Ruttenberg) ; 1959
Advisory Group Hearings 879 (statement of S. Bardn) ; Tarleau, Difficulties Faced
by Taxpayer Trying to Take Advantage of a Loss Carryover, 4 J. TAXATION 91
(1956).
333 IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1504.
334 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1501.
335 This issue has been discussed in detail in Part I with regard to the charitable
bootstraps and will be further noted here only as necessary, recognizing that the boot-
strap character of the transaction is woven through the other problems presented.
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X. THE TRANSFERABILITY OF Loss CARRYOVERS
Policy Considerations
The loss carryover and carryback provisions have been gradually
extended until they now cover nine years, including a three-year carry-
back and a five-year carryover.138  The major argument advanced for
these provisions is that because of the annual accounting principle and
the statutory progressive tax rates, an individual who has $10,000 of
income in one year and no income in the next year will pay a higher
total tax for the two years than will an individual with $5,000 of
income in each of the two years.3  The "inequity" of this result is
usually conceded, and various proposals for "averaging" income or for
the extension of the carryover and carryback technique, have been
brought forth. 8
The arguments in favor of averaging are, however, not as simple
or conclusive as the example might indicate. If one accepts the Haig-
Simons definition of income as the money value of the net accretion of
economic power over a period of time,33 the current policy of taxing
income only at the point of realization may in itself produce some degree
of averaging. For example, while the discoverer of oil may experience
a sharp increase in his economic net worth in the year of discovery, be-
336 Provisions for the carryover and carryback of losses have been contained in
the Code since the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 204(b), 40 Stat. 1061 (1919), being
eliminated by the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, § 218, 48 Stat.
209 and restored by the 1939 Code, added by ch. 247, § 122, 53 Stat. 867 (1939).
See Tarleau, The Place of Tax Loss Positions in Corporate Acquisitions, in JOINT
Comm. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG., 1ST SEss., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR
EcoNoMIc GROWTH AND STABI ITY-PAPERS SuBMIrrTED BY PANELISTS APPEARING
BEFORE THE SuBcOmmiTTEE ON TAX POLICY 610, 611 (Joint Comm. Print 1955)
[hereinafter cited as 1955 COMPENDIUM] ; H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., Ist Sess.
9 (1939). Recently, § 203 of the Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958 increased
the two-year carryback period to three years. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,-§ 172(b)
(1) (A).
337 See H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 336, at 9: "New enterprises . . . are
especially subject to wide fluctuations in earnings. . . . [A]llowance of a . . .
loss carry-over will . . . stimulate new enterprise."
338 See SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 153-56, 212-13 (1938); VicaxEY,
AGENDA FOR PROGRESsIvE TAXATION 164-97 (1947); Blough, Averaging Income for
Tax Purposes, 20 ACCOUNTING Rnv. 85 (1945); Driscoll, Income Averaging for Indi-
vidual Income-Tax Purposes, 1955 COMPENDIUM 175; Holt, Averaging of Income for
Tax Purposes: Equity and Fiscal-Policy Considerations, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 349 (1949) ;
Pechman, A Practical Averaging Proposal, 7 NAT'L TAX J. 261 (1954); Seidman,
Tax Averaging Plan, 7 J. TAXATION 166 (1957); Steger, On the Theoretical Equity
of an Averaging Concept for Income Tax Purposes, 13 TAX L. Ray. 211 (1958);
Taylor, Some Reflections on Income Averaging and a Proposal, 1959 Duax L.J. 202;
Vickrey, Averaging, Cumulative Assessment and Retirement Income Provisions, 1955
COMPENDIUM 871; a group of eight articles on averaging and the taxation of fluctu-
ating income, 1 HOUSE CoMm. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST SES$., TAX
RMvISION COMPENDIUM-COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX BASE
599-677 (Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 TAX REvIS ON COMPENDIUM].
339 HAIG, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (1921) ; SIMONS, op. cit. supra note 338,
at 51, 125.
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cause of the realization principle he is taxed only over a period of years
as he sells the oil. The net worth of a business may increase sharply
during a single year, but the owners pay tax over a number of years
only upon the receipt of salary and dividends. Similarly, an inventor
may collect and be taxed on his patent royalties over a period of years
even though his economic worth increased at the moment of inven-
tion. 40 A second objection to averaging provisions is that most busi-
ness and economic decisions involve a relatively short range process
and emphasize short payoff periods. Therefore, ability to pay should
be measured according to the short term concept of income upon which
individuals generally base their behavior rather than, through averag-
ing, upon lifetime or long-term periods. 41 Third, it is to some extent
a principle of income taxation that deductions should be directly related
to the income against which they are offset.84" 2 And finally, the anti-
cyclical effect of progressive income taxation, derived from the premise
that collections increase in prosperity and decrease in recession, would
presumably be diminished if yearly taxes are leveled by averaging:
taxes in prosperous years would be reduced by carrying over or back
losses of less prosperous years.343
Despite these objections, averaging is among the few arguments
for tax "relief" which find general acceptance. The most serious ob-
tacle to adoption of averaging is its administrative complexity as
compared to a strict annual accounting system. It is difficult enough
to process millions of returns each year, without the added adminis-
trative, evidentiary, and legal burdens imposed by considering past
and future years as well. Nevertheless, the idea that a workable
averaging approach to taxation would be desirable receives broad
support.8
4
340 See Steger, supra note 338, at 221-22. In another article, Steger makes an
analogous argument that one's personal net worth increases sharply upon the acquisi-
tion of a professional education and that this increase is realized only over a full career.
The analogy seems unrealistic, however, inasmuch as it is based on the value or
"worth" of a person. Steger, Lifetime Income Averaging: What It Means to the
Professional, 12 TAx L. Rtv. 427 (1957).341 See Slitor, The Flexibility of Income Tax Yield Under Averaging, 54 J. POL.
EcoN. 268 (1946) ; Steger, supra note 338, at 223-26.
342 See S. Rm. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954). An illustration of at
least nominal implementation of this policy is found in the statutory limitations on
the deductibility of losses incurred in so-called "hobby farming." See INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, §270; Treas. Reg. § 1270-1(b) (1959).
343 Conversely, it might be argued that the tax refunds obtainable in loss years
through carrybacks to profit years will somewhat temper the effects of a recession
or depression. See H.R. REP. No. 2198, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958): "Your Com-
mittee believes that this current refund [as a result of increasing the two year carry-
back to a three year carryback], rather than subsequently reduced taxes, is particularly
appropriate at the present time as a means of placing funds in the hands of business
in a year when many of them are incurring losses." This argument seems, however,
to assume that once funds are available in a depression year, they will be immediately
spent and thus re-enter the stream of commerce.
344 See note 338 spra.
19601
950 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Averaging and the Transferability of Loss Carryovers
The transfer of loss carryovers involves more than mere averag-
ing. At some point the transferee will so differ from the transferor-
in terms of ownership, corporate entity or business operations-that the
process will not be averaging but rather the use of a loss by a "differ-
ent" taxpayer. The loss bootstrap cases illustrate that the more
transferable a loss carryover becomes, the more clearly it provides
tax relief not limited to mere averaging. The effect of the loss boot-
strap transaction is to insulate the profits of a different taxpayer from
taxation through carryovers acquired at bargain prices, as part of a
plan whereby ordinary income is converted to capital gains.
The 1954 Code offers substantial evidence that carryovers are
designed to permit more than simple averaging. Sections 122(c) and
(d) of the 1939 Code provided that in determining the net operating
loss deduction, depletion should be limited to cost rather than per-
centage depletion. The object of these provisions was to prevent
the inclusion in loss deductions of items that did not really represent
an "economic loss." "' Cost depletion represents an actual outlay,
while the excess of percentage over cost depletion is a mere subsidy. 46
However, section 172 of the 1954 Code eliminates the adjustments
previously required in order to ensure that the net operating loss deduc-
tion would represent economic losses; therefore, loss carryovers now
include noneconomic subsidies as well as actual economic items. Thus,
if a taxpayer had annual income of $2,000, and a depletion deduction
of either $1,000 calculated on a cost basis or $7,000 figured on a per-
centage basis, he is regarded under the 1954 Code as having a loss
of $5,000 which may be carried over, whereas under the 1939 Code
he would have had economic income of $1,000. Under the 1954 Code,
then, the carrying over of losses becomes more than averaging; it is
a process of distributing subsidies evenly.
345 Similar provisions were provided under the 1939 Code for tax-exempt interest.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §26(c) (2) (B), added by ch. 63, § 202(c), 58 Stat. 53 (1944).
Thus, if a taxpayer incurred an operating "loss" of $1,000 in a particular tax year
but received $3,000 of tax-exempt interest, his actual economic income would be
$2,000. To allow a $1,000 loss carryover could hardly be construed as mere averaging.
846 There is little effort by the courts to limit or narrow the depletion deduction
in any way, despite objections to its unfavorable effects both on the equity of our tax
structure and on the concentration of wealth. See 105 CONG. REc. 7892-7914 (daily ed.
May 21, 1959) (remarks of Senator Proxmire) ; Gray, Percentage Depletion, Conser-
vation, and Economic Structure, 1955 COMPENDIUM 430; Gray, Tax Reform and the
Depletion Allowance, 1959-2 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 979; Harberger, The Tax-
ation of Mineral Industries, 1955 COMPENDIUM 439; Lubar, A Plan for Tax Reform,
Fortune, March 1959, pp. 92, 236, 238; Rudick, Depletion and Exploration and De-
velopment Costs, 1959-2 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 983; Hearings on Revenue
Revision of 1950 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-60, 177-219 (1950).
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One of the major objections to the transfer of loss carryovers is
that it permits persons with no economic relation to the loss to share
in its benefits. 47 This objection and the criticism of windfall trans-
fers 348 are concrete versions of the general policy against permitting
deductions except against the income to which they are attributable.
Continued dealings in loss carryovers also raise the issue whether
"averaging" is not merely a tax myth behind which dealings in loss
carryovers have become elaborated into an established set of commercial
operations. 49  This doubt is supported by the peculiar draftsmanship
of the 1954 Code: while solemnly avowing the desire to stop the
"peddling" of losses,3 5° Congress enacted a group of statutes that were,
at the least, ineffective to halt the "peddling" of operating losses.851
Other Policy Objections to Carryover Transferability
Where a loss company is utilized only for its loss carryovers, its
previous business is frequently liquidated, leaving only a loss shell and
often an accompanying decline in employment.3 52 Dealings in loss carry-
overs have also encouraged mergers and similar corporate combina-
tions, 53 thus increasing the concentration of economic power. 54
Arguments often advanced in support of transferability include,
first, that unless loss carryovers can be transferred, a losing business
will continue to operate when it would be more economical to terminate;
the other side of this argument, however, is that the transferability of
loss carryovers makes the dealing in loss companies to obtain their
carryovers so lucrative that businesses which might have been con-
tinued or revived are sometimes liquidated unnecessarily with an ob-
vious impact on employment and corporate concentration.
Second, it is argued that a loss corporation should be permitted
to buy a profit business inasmuch as the rehabilitation of the losing
847 See Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U.S. 319, 329-30 (1932), where Mr.
Justice Cardozo points out that "a different ruling would mean that a prosperous
corporation could buy the shares of one that had suffered heavy losses and wipe out
thereby its own liability for taxes. The mind rebels against the notion that Congress
in permitting a consolidated return was willing to foster an opportunity for juggling
so facile and so obvious."
348 See note 332 supra and accompanying text.
349 See Barkin & Perel, Trafficking in Loss Corporations, 104 CoNG. Rac. A4337
(daily ed. May 12, 1958). See also 1958 ALI STUDY 341-42, which questions the
need or desirability of free transferability of losses in view of the deduction for invest-
ment losses, the loss carryback, and the fact that the losing business has paid no tax
on its loss operations.
350 See note 329 .rupra.
351 See text accompanying note 389 infra.
352 See Barkln & Perel, supra note 349.
353 See 1958 ALI STUDY 342.
354 See Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71 HARv. L. REv. 254 (1957).
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business is economically desirable.3 55 However, the practical effect in
many circumstances may be less the "rehabilitation" of the losing busi-
ness than tax dealing in its loss carryovers. The profit business that is
acquired presumably could have continued to operate without being
acquired by the loss business, although admittedly there is an economic
advantage to the profit business in having portions of its income in-
sulated from taxation through the use of loss carryovers. This ad-
vantage is passed on to Owners in the bootstrap transfers inasmuch as
it makes possible payments to them that are larger, more assured and
more frequent than would be possible otherwise. The rehabilitation
argument is most valid where the loss business is an active, going con-
cern and where the profit business acquired is not of disproportionate
size. Under such circumstances, the issue is the desirability of the loss
business's being able to keep going, or even revive, through the financing
provided by the tax free income resulting from its ability to offset its
carryovers against the income of the profit business. Such income is
first available to, and benefits, the corporate enterprise, before it is dis-
tributed to Owners in the form of payments on the bootstrap "purchase"
price. However, if deductions are regarded as appropriate only against
the income of the economic activity that produced them, then to permit
a carryover here is to provide a form of indirect government subsidy
for loss businesses by letting them offset their carryovers against the
income of a different economic activity.
But even this argument for transferability of loss carryovers loses
its force under the circumstances characteristic of the loss bootstrap
transfers. Unless the loss business is particularly vigorous, it will not
be desirable to risk offsetting the income of the profit business by the
continued losses of the loss business. Therefore, the losing economic
activity will ordinarily be substantially reduced or terminated, or what
is the equivalent, the loss company will be a shell, or will be acquiring a
profit business substantially larger than itself. The tax advantages to
be derived from such a transaction will be much more significant than
any economic rehabilitation. Permitting such loss corporations to
diversify by acquiring a profit business may not be as indicative of the
Loss Business's economic revival as of the fact that it has sold its loss
carryovers to Profit Company's owners at a windfall price, and has
been paid a portion of the tax savings effected by Owners' subsequent
receipt of the ordinary income of the business at capital gains rates.
Third, it is contended that permitting the unrestricted sale of loss
carryovers would quickly reduce their prices to competitive levels, thus
355 See Tarleau, Acquisition of Loss Companies, 31 TAXES 1050, 1055 (1953).
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eliminating the objection to windfall prices.3  While this, if true, may
afford a justification for those who favor the free marketability of loss
carryovers, 5 7 it hardly meets the major objections to allowing X to
purchase Y's loss incurred in business A to offset against X's income
from business B.
Legal Approaches to Loss Carryover Transfers
Unlimited Transferability
The first and simplest legal approach 8 is to permit the transfer
of net operating losses without limitation. 59 If this approach were
accepted, dealings in loss shells would be unrestricted; and if the brisk
market in loss companies of recent years is any indication, those trans-
actions would ordinarily be at windfall prices. This approach does not
attempt to restrict the use of losses to the persons, businesses, or entities
that originally incurred them. While such a solution has the merits
both of frankness and perhaps of coming closest to describing the
actual pattern of decision, it would contribute to the current erosion
of the progressive income tax by permitting taxpayer X to reduce his
taxes by Y's losses.
356 See Tarleau, snpra note 332.
357 See Tarleau, suipra note 332; 1959 Advisory Group Hearings 835 (remarks of
Mr. Wolfman). According to Murphy, supra note 327, Wolfman is the chief architect
of the loss bootstrap transaction. See Wolfman's Memorandum with Respect to the
Availability of a Consolidated Net Operating Loss Carryover, Sale of Mattique Stock
to Artistic Foundations, Inc., Before the Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice (1958) (on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania). Cf. Tarleau,
supra note 355. Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 269(c) and ADVISORY GROUP ON
SUBcHAPTER C OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, REVISED REPORT ON CORPO-
RATE DISTRIBUTIONS AND ADjUSTMENTS 74 (1957), in Hearings on Advisory Group
Recommendations on Subchapters C, I, and K of the Internal Revenue Code Before
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2491 (1958), both
of which permit loss transferability if the price is within certain limits.
358 The diversity of approaches to the transfer of loss carryovers reflects the
absence of an effective, integrated solution. Among the many commentaries on this
topic, in addition to those which have previously been noted, are Arent, Current De-
velopments Affecting Loss Corporations, 35 TAXES 956 (1957); Arent, The Impact
of the Coastal Oil Decision Upon Loss Corporations, 8 J. TAXATION 14 (1958);
Cohen, Phillips, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Carry-
overs Accumulated Earnings Tax, 10 TAX L. REv. 277 (1955) ; Cuddihy, Methods of
Utilizing Loss Carryovers: Safe, Doubtful and Forbidden, 8 J. TAXATION 72 (1958) ;
Eldridge, When Can a Successor Corporation Use a Predecessor's Loss?, 8 J.
TAXATION 46 (1958); Kirkpatrick, Section 269 of the 1954 Code-Its Present and
Prospective Function in the Commissioner's Arsenal, 15 TAX L. REV. 137 (1960);
Levine & Petta, Libson Shops: A Study in Semantics, 36 TAXES 445 (1958) ; Sin-
rich, Libson Shops-An Argument Against Its Application Under the 1954 Code,
13 TAX L. REv. 167 (1958) ; Williams, Net Operating Loss Deduction, 35 TAXES 93
(1957); Comment, The Tax Benefit Rule and the Loss Carryover Provisions of the
1954 Code, 67 YALE L.J. 1394 (1958).
359 See Tarleau, supra note 332; 1957-58 ALl REPORT 43.
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An Increase in the Carryback Period
Another proposal is to increase the Usefulness of the loss to the
corporation that suffers it by lengthening the carryback period to as
long as five years.8 60 As the loss carryover and carryback periods now
cover nine years, it is questionable how much further, if at all, they
should be extended. Each extension precipitates a substantial revenue
loss: the 1958 extension of the two year net operating loss carryback to
three years was expected to result in a revenue loss of up to $50,000,000
in the first year.86' And additional carrybacks not only create in-
creased administrative complications but also give little tax aid either
to new corporations or to those with a string of loss years.
The Corporate Entity Approach
A third possible approach, upon which the early loss carryover
cases placed almost exclusive emphasis, is to permit only the legal entity
which incurred the losses to make use of them."62 But while the factor
of legal entity may have some reality in the case of the publicly held
company which is an economic organization separate and apart from
its shareholders, it is much less real with a closely held company. But
as long as the close corporate entity is to be used, a shareholder should
not be able at his option to deduct the corporation's net operating
losses.363 However, to emphasize only the legal entity irrespective of
continuity of business or of ownership is to engage in the kind of
formalism that helped make dealings in loss carryovers possible.
The two extreme examples of judicial application of the cor-
porate entity doctrine, Alprosa Watch Corp.364 and Newmarket Mfg.
Co. v. United States,'6" illustrate the rigidity of such a formal doctrine
when it is applied to complicated tax problems such as the manipula-
tion of corporate losses. In Alprosa, a glove corporation with an excess
profits credit was purchased, its name changed, its business moved, the
glove business discontinued, and the glove manufacturing assets sold.
The purchasers then transferred to this corporate "shell" a shipment
360 1958 ALI STUDY 342.
361 See H.R. REP. No. 2198, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958).
362 Nev Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934) ; Planters Cotton Oil
Co. v. Hopkins, 286 U.S. 332 (1932); Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d
330 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951).
363 Cf. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943), where the
Court emphasized that the choice of the advantages of incorporation as a method of
doing business required also the acceptance of the accompanying tax disadvantages.
364 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
363233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957). It is sur-
prising to note that the Commissioner sought certiorari in this case where he seemed
clearly wrong but failed to do so in D. K. Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 F.2d 567 (5th
Cir. 1955), where he seemed clearly right. See Part I at 640-41.
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of watches that they were about to sell at a profit, and sought to deduct
the prior excess profits credit from this profit. The government, seek-
ing to disallow the credits, contended that the corporation had been
purchased solely to evade or avoid taxes and that the transaction was
unrealistic and served no business purpose. The Tax Court, however,
held that the glove company, despite the changes in its name, location
and business, was the same entity that earned the prior excess profits
credit and therefore was entitled to use it. Such a formalistic applica-
tion of the corporate entity doctrine could result in undue severity as
well as unusual benefits to the taxpayer. In the Newmarket case, a
Massachusetts corporation created a Delaware corporation and merged
with it for the purpose of changing domicile; and except for domicile,
the corporations were identical. The Commissioner argued that no
carryback was permissible because the two corporations were separate
entities. Emphasizing the realities the court rejected this argument.
The possible harshness of such insistence on the corporate entity
test alone spurred the judicial creation of the fiction that where there
was a "statutory merger" loss carryovers could be transferred on the
theory that the resulting corporation continued the corporate entity of
the merged corporations. 8" But when an artificial doctrine is countered
with another fiction, clarification rarely results. When overemphasis
on the corporate entity was met with this merger doctrine, even more
formal distinctions arose, such as the line drawn between a "statutory
merger" to acquire a subsidiary, and the "liquidation" of the sub-
sidiary into the parent.367
The Tax Avoidance Approach and Section 129
A fourth approach has been to emphasize "tax avoidance," or
the dealing in loss companies primarily for their tax losses. The chief
statutory weapon against this type of transaction was section 129 of
the 1939 Code. 68 Section 129 was intended to prevent certain manip-
ulations of controlled entities as well as dealings in loss corporations.
369
The legislative history of the section emphasizes that there must be a
continuing business, implying that dealings in "loss shells" would not
366 Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 306 U.S. 522 (1939) ; E. & J. Gallo
Winery v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1955); Stanton Brewery, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 176 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1949); Koppers Co. v. United States, 134 F.
Supp. 290 (Ct. Cl. 1955); but see California Casket Co., 19 T.C. 32 (1952).
367 Patten Fine Papers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1957);
F. C. Donovan, Inc. v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass.), vacated and
remanded, 261 F.2d 470 (1st Cir. 1958) ; Gramm Trailer Corp., 26 T.C. 689 (1956).
36 8 Now Ii'T. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 269. For convenience, "section 129" will be
used to refer to both the old and new sections.
369 H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 49 (1943) ; S. REP. No. 627, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26, 58 (1943).
19601
956 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.108:943
be approved.3 70  Section 129 was an effort to provide a broad and
flexible substance over form approach to various dealings in deduc-
tions, credits and allowances,371 and in this respect it is similar to
section 45.372
The Case History of Section 129
Much of the draftsmanship of section 129 is uncertain or faulty. It
defined control by a rigid fifty per cent test rather than by a more flexible
requirement directed at the substance of the relationship. It set up a
subjective standard of "principal purpose to avoid or evade taxes" as its
principal criterion. And rather than aiming language directly at the
problem of loss peddling, the section was limited in its operation to only
those cases where the acquiring of corporate control or corporate prop-
erty was the vehicle of loss peddling. Nevertheless, the language of the
section is sufficiently workable to have substantially reduced dealings
in loss companies had the courts enforced it in the spirit in which it was
enacted.
However, judicial formalism completely nullified section 129 for
many years, particularly through the courts' failure to find the sub-
jective "principal purpose" of tax avoidance. 73  Another important
formal limitation on section 129 was provided by a dictum in Alprosa
which interpreted the statute as permitting disallowance of a deduction,
credit, or similar item claimed by the acquiring corporation only when
the item is attributable to the "acquired" corporation; but the "ac-
quiring" corporation may not be deprived of deductions, credits, or
similar items attributable to itself. Thus section 129 is avoided so
370 S. REP. No. 627, supra note 369, at 60.
371 The important provisions of § 129, essentially re-enacted by § 269, are: "If
(1) any person or persons acquire . . . directly or indirectly, control of a corpo-
ration, or (2) any corporation acquires . . . directly or indirectly, property of
another corporation . . . and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was
made is evasion or avoidance of Federal income or excess profits tax by securing the
benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person or corporation
would not otherwise enjoy, then such deduction, credit, or other allowance shall not
be allowed. . . . [C]ontrol means the ownership of stock possessing at least 50 per
centum of the total combined voting power . . . or . . . of the total value ....
(b) . . . [T]he Commissioner is authorized-(1) to allow . . . any part of any
amount disallowed . . . if he determines that such allowance will not result in the
evasion or avoidance of Federal income . . . tax for which the acquisition was made;
or (2) to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, and distribute, apportion, or
allocate the deductions, credits, or allowances the benefit of which was sought to be
secured . .. ."
3 72 See Part I at 669-74.
373 See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954). Both reports comment that § 129 "has proved in-
effectual . . . because of the necessity of proving that tax avoidance was the primary
purpose of the transaction." While some of the § 129 cases here considered deal with
tax deductions or credits other than operating losses, the principles involved in the
application of the section do not turn on that distinction.
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long as the loss company, even though a mere "shell," is the survivor
of a merger.374 Such an emphasis on corporate entity, however, dis-
regards the very loss peddling it facilitates. Analogous limitations on
the statute were provided by holding that the tax deduction or credit
at issue did not "stem from the acquired control," 376 or that the
statute did not apply so long as a "business purpose" could be
discerned3
76
Surprisingly, however, some recent cases have enforced section
129 in something of the spirit in which it was enacted. Coastal Oil
Storage Co. v. Commissioner,177 although not citing Alprosa, rejects
its doctrine that deductions, credits or allowances may be disallowed
under section 129 only to the "acquiring" and not to the "acquired"
company. The Fourth Circuit emphasized that section 129 was
applicable wherever the acquiring corporation obtained the benefit of
an exemption or credit it would not have enjoyed except for the acqui-
sition, even though the exemption or credit was derived from its own
operations.
In Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson,378 the assets of a loss cor-
poration engaged in coal mining were sold and the corporate shares
transferred to new owners who thereupon used the corporation to en-
gage in the oil transportation business. The Fifth Circuit, basing its
decision on section 129 and the Supreme Court case of Libson Shops,
Inc. v. Koehler,17 ' refused to permit a carryover of the net operating
losses from mining to the new oil business."' 0 Several other decisions
have joined this apparent renaissance of section 129.3"1
874 T.V.D. Co., 27 T.C. 879 (1957) ; Wage, Inc., 19 T.C. 249 (1952), acq., 1954-2
Cum. BULL. 6. See Arent, The Impact of the Coastal Oil Decision Upon Loss Cor-
porations, 8 J. TAXATION 14 (1958); Cohen et al., supra note 358, at 291-92.3 75 Commodores Point Terminal Corp., 11 T.C. 411, 417 (1948), acq., 1949-1
Cum. BULL. 1.
376 See Commissioner v. Chelsea Prods., Inc., 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952);
Wage, Inc, 19 T.C. 249 (1952), acq., 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 6; Berland's, Inc., 16 T.C.
182 (1951), acq., 1951-2 Cum. BULL. 1; Alcorn Wholesale Co., 16 T.C. 75 (1951),
acq, 1951-2 Cum. BuLL. 1; A.B. & Container Corp., 14 T.C. 842 (1950), acq., 1950-2
Cum. BuLL. 1. This "business purpose" doctrine is consistent with the general tendency
to reject substance over form approaches on the grounds that the transaction is "not
sham" or that it is "bona fide." Compare the treatment of § 45 discussed in Part I
at 669-74, the sale and leaseback cases at 675, the thin capitalization cases at 660, and
the original bootstrap cases at 639.
37242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957).
878264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816 (1959).
370 353 U.S. 382 (1957). See note 384 infra and accompanying text.
380While the District Court opinion in Mill Ridge, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9489
(N.D. Ala. 1958), was based only on Libson Shops and not on § 129, the court refused
to follow A.B. & Container Corp., 14 T.C. 842 (1950), acq., 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 1,
which embodied the Alprosa "acquiring-acquired" distinction.
381 See British Motor Distribs., 31 T.C. 437 (1959), rev'd, CCH 1960 STAND.
FED. TAx REP. (60-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) 1[ 9417 (9th Cir. March 31, 1960); Elko Realty
Co., 29 T.C. 1012, aff'd per curiam, 260-F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1958); American Pipe &
Steel Corp., 25 T.C. 351 (1955), aff'd, 243 F.2d 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
906 (1957). And in James Realty Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 306 (D. Minn.
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The Continuity of Business Approach
Another approach, put forth as consistent with the general prin-
ciple of permitting deductions to offset only income to which they are
reasonably related, is to forbid the transfer of loss carryovers where
"the income against which the offset is claimed was not produced by
substantially the same business which incurred the losses." 382 How-
ever, under this approach problems of how to allocate the loss carry-
overs to old business income arise where old business assets are split
up, as by a divisive reorganization, or where new business assets are
acquired. This tracing problem is less difficult where a consolidated
return is filed since, after affiliation, each business retains its separate
corporate form.383 A second defect in the continuity of business ap-
proach is that it would deny a carryover upon a change of business even
though there had been no change in the corporation or its stock owner-
ship. Thus, it would prevent the type of economic rehabilitation
achieved by shifting to a different line of business while allowing, in
the case of a sale of the business, a windfall to accrue to the new
owners to the extent that the existence of carryovers is not reflected
fully in the purchase price.
In Libson Shops, 384 sixteen retail clothing corporations and a man-
agement corporation, all owned by the same persons in the same propor-
tions, were merged. The resulting corporation sought to deduct the
prior year's losses of three of the retail corporations. These units did
not have income in the year in issue, which was after the merger. The
Supreme Court denied the carryover on the ground that "the income
against which the offset is claimed was not produced by substantially
the same businesses which incurred the losses"-a holding difficult
to reconcile with the long line of cases from New Colonial Ice Co. v.
Helvering 885 to Alprosa and Newmarket which emphasize the cor-
porate entity rather than business continuity.
1959), § 129 was applied to a corporate formation whereby a real estate development
business was incorporated in multiple corporate form. Relying on the Coastal Oil-
Mill Ridge rejection of the Alprosa doctrine, the court upheld the Commissioner's
disallowance of surtax exemptions and excess profits credits, citing § 45 as providing
additional strength for its position. This decision reflects a greater judicial inclination
to look through the close corporate entity than has usually been found in the application
of §§ 45 and 129.
882 American Trans-Ocean Corp. v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 97, 98 (2d Cir. 1956)
(consolidated return situation).
383 The long delay in issuing the regulations under §§ 381 and 382 of the 1954
Code may be attributable to the difficulties involved in this allocation problem and
in the question of what is "substantially the same business." In this connection, note
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381 (a) -1(b) (2), 25 Fed. Reg. 756 (1960), published Janu-
ary 29, 1960, which provides that only a single corporation may be an "acquiring
corporation" for purposes of § 381. "Acquiring corporation" is defined as the corpo-
ration which ultimately acquires, directly or indirectly, all the assets transferred.
384353 U.S. 382 (1957).
885 292 U.S. 435 (1934) ; see note 362 supra and accompanying text.
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The Continuity of Ownership Approach
Another major approach takes as its criterion the degree of con-
tinuity of ownership between the transferor and the transferee. Sec-
tion 382(b) of the 1954 Code requires that after the transaction
shareholders of a loss corporation hold at least twenty per cent of the
outstanding stock of the acquiring corporation in order for the losses
to be fully transferable."' By this approach, the losses would not be
transferable even if the business remained unchanged, the theory being
that the new owners should not benefit from the losses of the old
owners unless the old owners retain a substantial interest. On the
other hand, losses could be offset against income from any new business
activity--contrary to the continuity of business test and, to the extent
that the interest of the old owners is emphasized, cutting across the
corporate entity concept.
It is arguable that only that percentage of the loss carryovers
should transfer as equals the percentage of old owners remaining.""
The lower the percentage of ownership required to be retained by the
old owners, the more the new owners acquire a loss not attributable to
their own economic activity. On the other hand, the larger the re-
quired percentage of retained ownership, the more difficult it will be
for losses to transfer over, and minority shareholders may lose the
benefit of the loss carryover. While this may be acceptable as one
of the detriments that accompany the many advantages of using the
corporate entity form, it is argued that without some transferability of
loss carryovers, an uneconomic emphasis is placed on continuing a
losing business so as not to lose the use of its loss carryovers.
Tran4er of Loss Carryovers Under the 1954 Code
The 1954 Code combines most of the approaches previously dis-
cussed. Section 381 (a) provides that there may be a transfer of net
operating loss carryovers where one corporation acquires the assets
of another corporation in certain section 332 liquidations, or in A, C,
F, or certain D reorganizations . 8 8 The general approval granted by
section 381 is, however, limited by the provisions of section 382. Sec-
tion 382 (a) states that if any one or more of the ten largest stock-
386Under §382(b), the transfer of 5% of the loss carryover is denied for each
percentage point below 20% of the stock of the acquiring corporation held by the
shareholders of the old loss company. The .1957-58 ALI REPORT 50 would require
that the owners of the old loss corporation acquire at least a 33% interest in the new
corporation before losses would be transferable.
387 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954).
388 Section 381 does not apply to liquidations under § 332 where the basis of the
assets distributed is determined under § 334(b) (2), or to B, E, and certain D reor-
ganizations.
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holders has, within a two-year period, increased his or their percentage
of the outstanding stock by at least fifty percentage points, and the
corporation has not continued to carry on a trade or business "sub-
stantially the same" as that conducted before the change in ownership
of stock, then the net operating loss carryovers will not be transferable.
Section 382(b) reduces the carryover by five per cent for each per-
centage point that the percentage interest in the acquiring company of
the owners of the old loss company falls below twenty per cent after
the transaction. Section 269(c) adds to section 129 of the 1939 Code
the provision that if the consideration paid on any acquisition of control
under section 269 (a) is "substantially disproportionate" to the aggre-
gate of the adjusted basis of the property and the "tax benefits" ac-
quired, it shall be "prima fade evidence of the principal purpose of
evasion or avoidance."
These provisions contain elements of each of the approaches noted
above. The corporate entity theory is adopted by the 1954 Code insofar
as loss carryovers presumably will not survive certain corporate dis-
solutions except pursuant to the specified reorganizations. Because
the limits on transferability contained in section 382 (a) refer only to
acquisition of a loss corporation, it may be inferred that if a loss cor-
poration "acquires" a profit company, the loss carryovers would be
available by virtue of the entity theory. Inasmuch as this Alprosa
loophole was so prominent a portion of existing law, one might con-
clude that Congress intended to leave it uncorrected. Any doubt as to
the current availability of the Alprosa entity doctrine arises only be-
cause the courts have suddenly begun to enforce section 129.3"9 The
continuity of ownership approach is reflected in the percentage of
ownership provisions in sections 269 and 382. Section 382 (a) incor-
porates the continuity of business approach in its provision that loss
carryovers are extinguished upon certain purchases if the loss cor-
poration has not continued to carry on substantially the same trade or
business. The 1954 Code also purports to embody the approach
centered on limiting tax avoidance by means of the re-enactment and
amendment of old section 129, now section 269, as a weapon against
dealings in loss corporations.
In fact, however, the 1954 Code may have weakened the previous
statutory restraints on the traffic in loss companies!'" In the first
place, section 172 deletes the reference to "the taxpayer" found in sec-
tion 122 of the 1939 Code. This terminology was the starting point
of the entity approach-artificial as it was, it at least put some limits
389 See note 381 supra and accompanying text.
390 See 104 CONG. REC. A4337-40 (daily ed. May 12, 1958) (extension of remarks
of Representative Aime J. Forand).
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on the traffic in loss carryovers. Deletion of this language would have
been desirable if the 1954 Code had supplied alternative approaches
designed to meet tax avoidance in this area.
Second, it would have been possible to redraft section 129 so that
the statute eliminated the subjective "principal purpose" test, clearly
covered both "acquiring" and "acquired" companies, improved the
"control" test, and corrected the "gross income" language--in brief,
deleted the language used by court decisions to negate section 129.
None of this was done. Section 269(c) provides that if the price paid
is substantially disproportionate to the aggregate of the adjusted basis
of the property and of the "tax benefits" acquired, there is prima facie
evidence of a principal purpose to evade or avoid. In other words, it
is permissible to deal in tax losses themselves-the "tax benefits"-so
long as the price is right.
Third, other portions of sections 269, 381 and 382 present an
invitation to deal in loss companies. Sections 269(a) and 382(a),
for instance, contain "50 per cent" control or ownership requirements.
But it is as easy to achieve effective control with forty per cent as with
fifty per cent. The very use of specific arithmetic figures usually facili-
tates tax avoidance plans. Similarly, the twenty per cent continuity of
ownership rule set forth in section 382(b) will often offer little or no
obstacle. If it is not convenient to give the shareholders of the loss
company twenty per cent of the voting common stock of the transferee,
they will get their twenty per cent in voting preferred stock; and if that
also is inconvenient, there are other routes. For example, B re-
organizations are excluded from the operation of section 381 (a). A
profit company therefore can acquire a loss company's stock in exchange
for a small amount of its own stock, and the loss company will then be
liquidated into the profit company. The chance of a court applying
substance over form principles and holding such a transaction to be
a "C" reorganization (which would make section 382(b) relevant)
appear minimal in view of the current judicial tendency to ignore the
doctrine of substance over form. Another and similar loophole, made
possible by the loose drafting of sections 381 and 382, exists when a
profit company (X) transfers a new business to a loss company (Y)
in return for ninety per cent of Y's stock. This device utilizes section
351, which also was "overlooked" by section 381, to permit X to pur-
chase Y without being subject to the provisions of section 382 (a).
Equally important, the 1954 Code not only eases the restrictions
upon business dealings in loss carryovers but also weakens the only
significant justification of loss carryover transferability-the averag-
ing argument-by eliminating from section 172 the "economic loss"
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limitations. This was done through the deletion of the provisions re-
quiring, for example, that in computing loss carryovers the actual
economic loss be taken into account by eliminating the effect of tax ex-
empt interest and of the excess of percentage over cost depletion.
Other Proposals
One argument that has been urged against the transferability of
loss carryovers is that sharp unemployment has often accompanied the
liquidation of loss businesses as a part of the process of utilizing their
loss carryovers.39' Union representatives have urged that loss carry-
overs should be denied if a business is terminated at any time within
three years after a change in ownership, where the former share-
holders of the loss corporation have a less than fifty per cent interest in
the corporation after either purchase or reorganization. 92  This pro-
posal, however, would not preclude transferability, for example, where
a forty per cent change in ownership is accompanied by a change in the
business conducted; nor would it prevent relatively free transfer of
loss carryovers whenever the business assets of the loss corporation are
so insubstantial that it is worthwhile tax-wise to continue to operate the
loss company for three years after acquisition. The answer to un-
economic liquidations of loss businesses would appear to lie more in the
enactment of proper restrictions on the transfer of loss carryovers, than
in making the preservation of employment the criterion of transfer-
ability.
The Subchapter C Advisory Group recommends that where there
is a fifty per cent change in ownership of the loss corporation, loss
carryovers be limited to fifty percent of the consideration paid for the
business.393 The Group contends that under such a rule the acqui-
sition of the business, rather than the tax benefit of the loss carryovers,
would necessarily be the primary objective of the transaction.894  The
391 Ibid.
392 See Statement of S. Barldn, Hearings on General Revenue Revision Before
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3101-17 (1957). See
also Barkin & Perel, supra note 349.
393 ADVISORY GROUP ON SUBCHAPTER C OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954,
REVISED REPORT ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS 567-73, 600-02
(1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 ADVISORY GROUP REPORT], in Hearings on Advisory
Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code
Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 473 (1959).
394 Assuming a 50% corporate tax rate, this would require that at least three
times as much be paid for the other assets of the business as for the tax advantages
of the loss carryover: if there is a loss carryover of $4,000,000 according to this
formula $8,000,000 would have to be paid for the business before the entire carryover
could be transferred. And inasmuch as the carryover is worth only $2,000,000 at the
50% tax rate, the business assets must be valued at $6,000,000. The Advisory Group
felt that this formula would prevent dealings in loss shells for the purpose of tax
evasion or avoidance.
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1958 ALl Study39 5 criticizes these proposals as directed only against
"sham" transactions and against the acquisition of corporate "shells."
While the proposals seem broad enough to limit some undesirable
transfers of loss carryovers, the Advisory Group's philosophy that one
is not really dealing in tax attributes if the greater part of the con-
sideration is not paid for "tax benefits" is subject to question. Finally,
the Group proposal fails to deal with the problem of the acquisition of
profit businesses by loss corporations.
The Advisory Group also recommends amending section 269 to
add the presumption that an acquisition is for the purpose of evading or
avoiding taxes where the corporation does not continue to carry on
"substantially the same" trade or business.3 96 But if a continuity of
business test is really desired, it should be included specifically rather
than by relying upon a "presumption" which might meet an uncertain
judicial fate.
XI. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO Loss TRANSFERS
Policy Considerations
In view of the limitations of the averaging rationale and the un-
desirability of allowing one man's income to offset another man's loss,
loss transfers should be held to a minimum. In other words, whatever
the merits of averaging, it should not be extended beyond the immediate
taxpayer who incurred the loss. The reply to this conclusion is usually
that one will lose one's own averaging power-the loss carryover or
carryback-unless one can transfer losses. Even if this point were con-
ceded, and with a nine year period in which to carry back and carry
forward its force is limited, one's losses will not ordinarily be transferred
at full value, as no one is likely to pay a full $50,000 for $50,000 worth of
tax benefits. Therefore, even if the price is not set so low as to pro-
vide a "windfall," "I the best of loss transfers will still result in the
use of part of the loss carryover to offset another person's profit, in
addition to the "recoupment" or averaging of one's own losses. For
example, if a $100,000 loss carryover is transferred for the equivalent
of $40,000, then $40,000 is used to "average" the income of the tax-
payer who incurred the losses, but $12,000 is available to offset an
outsider's profits, inasmuch as a $100,000 carryover offers $52,000 in
tax benefits at a corporate income tax rate of fifty-two per cent. Where
the transaction is at the windfall level-as when $10,000 is received
395 At 343-45.
396 1958 ADVISORY GRoUP REPORT 573.
397 See note 327 supra.
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for $100,000 in carryovers-then averaging is so substantially an offset
against the outsider's income that even the proponents of free trans-
ferability may hesitate.3
98
What would be the tax effects of restricting the transfer of loss
carryovers as much as possible? Even if no loss carryovers could be
transferred, the taxpayer would still get a capital loss on his stock
investment. If the loss qualified as a loss on small business stock under
section 1244 of the Code, the taxpayer could claim an ordinary loss on
up to $25,000 of his investment.399 And often the shareholder can use
the option granted by subchapter S and offset an operating loss of the
corporation against his own income. The existence of these possibili-
ties limits the argument that the shareholder must be able to transfer
his losses in order to recoup them. Furthermore, loss transfers will
usually be offset against ordinary income, while the shareholder in the
close corporation (for whom the loss transfer problem primarily arises)
rarely pays more than a capital gains tax on his receipt of the cor-
poration's earnings. Thus, the shareholder of a loss corporation seems
to have adequate relief at present through: 1) a nine year period in
which losses may be averaged; 2) a capital loss for his stock invest-
ment; 3) an ordinary loss for an investment of up to $25,000 in small
business stock; 4) the ability, in some circumstances, to utilize the loss
himself by way of the option provided in subchapter S; 5) the ability,
in many circumstances, to receive at capital gains rates the corporate
income that is averaged by the deduction in full of loss carryovers at
ordinary income rates; and 6) the ability to include in loss carryovers
not merely economic losses but also the effect of items such as percentage
depletion or tax-exempt interest, whose effect can-thus be spread over
several tax years. These factors suggest that there is no need to permit
further loss transfers, whether in the form of loss "shells" or loss
bootstraps, or through more legitimate averaging techniques.
Even if it be concluded that losses should be available only to the
taxpayer who incurred them, the practical problem remains of deter-
mining who that taxpayer is. Most of the approaches considered have
emphasized only a single factor as the basis for determining the identity
of the taxpayer eligible for a loss transfer. The factors stressed have
been the degree of continuity of ownership, the degree of continuity
of business, the degree of continuity of legal entity, or the degree of
3 9 8 Although he otherwise advocates the free transferability of tax losses, Tarleau
concedes that to allow free trade in tax losses during a depression period would so
endanger the revenues that it would not be possible to allow the transfer of loss
shells. See Tarleau, Difficulties Faced by Taxpayer Trying to Take Advantage of
a Loss Carryover, 4 J. TAXATION 91 (1956).
399 Up to $50,000 may be claimed as an ordinary loss by a husband and wife
filing a joint return.
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"tax avoidance" present in a particular transaction. It is perhaps char-
acteristic of tax jurisprudence that most of these approaches assess
neither the entire relationship presented nor all pertinent policy con-
siderations; only an occasional decision emphasizes a combination of
factors, rather than a single variable.
The disadvantages of relying on legal entity alone have been demon-
strated. But continuity of ownership and continuity of business are also
not self sufficient criteria. The real issue is whether there is sufficient
overall continuity between the person incurring the losses and the person
seeking to make use of them, so that the former's losses are being aver-
aged rather than used to offset the latter's income. Continuity of busi-
ness as a sole standard is not sufficient to meet that issue, for if business
assets are sold, and no more, the loss carryovers should not accompany
the assets even though the "business activity" continues. Nor will mere
continuity of ownership suffice: if all the stock of a corporation is sold,
and no more, the new owner rather than the old owner should benefit
from the previous losses. And "tax avoidance" turns on whether the
transaction was characterized by a mere dealing in tax attributes, which
in turn is a corollary of the degree of continuity. The loss shell situa-
tions all involve cases where the only continuity lies in the presence of
the same entity and both the business and the ownership have changed-
the mark of avoidance is the absence of sufficient continuity to warrant
offsetting losses against another's income.
A Theoretical Solution
If the basic principle of taxing income to the person and business
activity earning it, and at progressive rates, were rigidly adhered to,
the only logically permissible deductions would be those attributable to
the costs of earning income. As various tax commentators have pointed
out, the numerous types of personal deductions are, in theory, incon-
sistent with these principles of progressive income taxation and are, as
such, a source of tax erosion.40
400 See Blum, The Effects of Special Proviions in the Income Tax on Taxpayer
Morale, 1955 COMENDIUM 251; Cary, Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code: A
Requiem in Honor of the Departing Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 H.ARv. L. REV.
745 (1955); Groves, Special Tax Provisions and the Economy, 1955 CONPENDIUM
286; Hellmuth, Erosion of the Federal Corporation Income Tax Base, 1955 Com-
PENDIum 888; Hess, The Gentle Art of Tax Avoidance, The Reporter, April 16, 1959,
p. 12; Lubar, A Plan for Tax Reform, Fortune, March 1959, p. 92; Mills, Curtis,
Ruttenberg, Heller, Rudick, Thomson, all in Mills & others, What Can We Do About
Taxes, Fortune, July 1959, p. 90; Paul, Erosion of the Tax Base and Rate Structure,
11 TAx L. Rxv. 203 (1956); Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, 10
NAT'L TAx J. 1 (1957); Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Base for Individuals, 58
CoLU m. L. REv. 815 (1958); Thompson & Silberman, Can Anything Be Done About
Corporate Taxes?, Fortune, May 1959, p. 121; Hearings on the General Revision of
the Internal Revenue Code Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); and see the group of articles appearing in the 1959 TAx
REVIsIoN COMPENDIUM at 1-167.
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Strict consistency with the theory that only deductions represent-
ing the costs of earning income should be allowed would demand that
loss transfers be denied except as offsets against the income created by
the economic activity incurring the loss. But one of the reasons for the
confusing multiplicity of approaches to the treatment of loss carryovers
is that tax theory is not fully articulate as to whether such income is to
be attributed to a particular economic activity or to the owner of the
income engendered by that activity. If a policy of rigidly limiting loss
transfers is to be applied, both possibilities must be accorded weight: a
loss transfer should be denied except to the original owners of the eco-
nomic activity that produced the loss. Where there is a percentage
change in ownership, the loss transfer should be reduced correspondingly
or, in one view, eliminated where the percentage change has exceeded the
point of effective control. But whatever the theoretic merits of so
rigorous an approach and whatever its desirability, it would not cur-
rently be acceptable even though it is now partly mirrored in the con-
solidated return regulations and in the language of Libson Shops. This
theoretical approach does, however, indicate the framework' of the loss
carryover problem.
A Practical Formula for Determining Loss Transferability
It is submitted that there is available a rought formula to bridge the
gap between theoretical solution and practical implementation-in any
loss transfer situation, it may be concluded that the end result is
averaging one's own income and not offsetting another's income, if
there is substantial continuity of any two of the three factors of owner-
ship, legal entity, and economic activity (business). Under this
formula, there are eight basic situations to be considered.
For example, if (1) there is a change in the business and a change
in ownership but the legal entity remains the same, there exists the
typical loss shell situation exemplified by Alprosa and proscribed as
tax avoidance by section 269. On the other hand, if (2) the business
and ownership remain the same but the legal entity is changed, two
factors remain constant and the loss transfer should be and is per-
missible, as Newmarket demonstrates. If (3) ownership changes but
the business and legal entity remain unaltered-as when all the stock
of a corporation is sold-it is clear that the loss would run with the
combination of the business and the legal entity (two factors) and
would not remain with the old owners. But if (4) both the business
and the entity change while the ownership remains the same, the factual
situation of Libson Shops exists and transferability is denied.
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Where (5) the ownership and the legal entity continue but there
is a change in the business, transferability might seem permissible on
the ground that a corporation, like an individual proprietor, should be
able to change its business without losing the averaging benefits of prior
losses. This is the most difficult application of the formula and is the
point where it deviates from the theoretical solution set forth above in
that it permits the loss carryover to be utilized. Conversely, however,
where (6) ownership and the legal unity are changed, two factors have
not remained continuous and thus transferability should be denied. In
other words, if business assets are sold, operating losses will not go
with them.
Where (7) there is a change in the business, the ownership and
the entity, it would seem that offsetting rather than averaging would
result. This answer conflicts, however, with section 382(b) where
changes in the business, in the legal entity, and in eighty per cent of
the stock ownership are permitted without destroying the carryover.
Where (8) the situation is reversed and the business, ownership and
legal entity remain continuous, the only policy issue is the desirability
of averaging and not the question of loss transfers.
Despite the simplicity of this "two factor formula," there is nothing
magical or conceptual about it. It is a reflection of the complexities
introduced by the artificial entity doctrine and its assumption that a
legal entity is a person like anyone else. The peculiar division which
this doctrine produces between economic reality and legal result in-
dicates that reliance on the entity concept alone could produce only
artificiality in the loss transfer area-and so it did. But the two factor
formula, by combining the entity approach alternatively with one of
the two prevailing notions of the economic right to a loss-either that
losses should go with the economic activity that produced them, or with
their original beneficial ownership-achieves a reasonable degree of
reality in distinguishing permissible averaging from prohibited off-
setting. This is not meant to suggest that the formula can or should
be mechanically applied; the real question remains the total relationship
between the loss, its source and its transferee. But the formula, if used
in the light of the policy approach recommended, may help clarify what
has been a confused area.
Reasoning from the policy conclusion that taxpayers already have
available so many forms of averaging that loss transfers should be kept
to a minimum so as to reduce the possibility of offsetting an outsider's
income, it follows that the two factor formula should be applied by
placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer. Specifically, if a necessary
factor is that substantially the same business is being conducted, many
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difficulties arise in seeking to trace through and allow loss carryovers
only against the income from the old business. Particularly is this
true where the business assets are split or new assets acquired." 1 The
strict answer is that the taxpayer should have the burden of so segregat-
ing assets and their related income as to meet the requirements for a
loss transfer.0 2 If he cannot do so, then he will still be able to utilize
the other forms of averaging available to him. Inasmuch as the Code
itself adopts the "substantially the same business" criterion in section
382(a), Congress obviously did not consider it too complicated a
standard to be applied; certainly it is no more difficult than attempting
to value a closely held corporation. Such problems of proof are typical
of the effort to get at the substance of any complex legal-factual
situation.
In harmony with this strict approach, "change in ownership"
should be defined restrictively, so as to include a transfer both of effec-
tive control, irrespective of the percentage of stock changing hands,
and of a fixed minimum percentage of stock whose transfer would be
treated as signifying in any event a change in ownership." 3 If the
economic benefit of ownership of the losses is viewed as more significant
than control of the company, an alternative formulation might reduce
the loss deduction in proportion to the percentage reduction in the
interest retained by the old owners.
There is, however, at least one situation where the two factor
formula may not be adequate to prevent the offsetting of one person's
income against another person's losses, namely, where a loss company
acquires a profit business or a group of them, in order to offset its own
losses.40 4 From the standpoint of ownership, the loss company is
averaging its own losses against its own income. But if the idea that
income from one economic activity should not be available to offset the
losses from another is stressed, the result becomes more doubtful.
Briefly, if there is a substantial change in economic activity alone, may
there be any loss transfer? In strict theory, a loss transfer should be
401 See Levine & Petta, supra note 358; 1958 ALI STuDY 346-48; Sinrich, supra
note 358; 1958 ADVISORY GROUP REPORT 568: "[The continuity of business test in
Libson Shops] . . . would result in too narrow a rule, not in harmony with the
general carryover scheme of the statute, and . . . very difficult to draft and apply."
402 The Commissioner has taken a very similar position with respect to the treat-
ment of loss carryovers and carrybacks under the 1939 Code. See Rev. Rul. 59-395,
1959 INT.,REv. BULL. No. 51, at 20, which permits certain net operating losses to be
offset only against the income of the assets to which they are attributable. This would
seem to put the burden of proof on the taxpayer.
403 Cf. H.R. Rlp. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42, A142-43 (1954), which so
provided upon a 50% or more change of ownership in a close corporation, but made
that its sole test.
404 This is the fifth situation discussed above.
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denied on such facts; consistent with this view, the consolidated return
regulations 405 do not permit the offsetting of preaffiliation losses from
one economic activity (an unaffiliated corporation) against the post-
affiliation income from another (an affiliated group or unaffiliated cor-
poration). On the other hand, if the owner of the corner barber shop
loses money and buys a grocery store against whose income he offsets
his losses, ownership rather than economic activity is likely to be
emphasized.400
The conflict over whether a change in business alone should destroy
loss transferability is mirrored in Libson Shops, cited above as a variant
of the two factor formula; but it is not fully clear exactly what Libson
Shops held in the context of the formula.40 7  The facts included a
change in two factors: business and entity. However, the language of
the decision stressed only the former factor-that the losses of one
business may not offset the income of another. Libson Shops may
mean that there can be no deduction of losses except against the income
of the economic activity which produced them, even though there is
continuity of ownership and entity. If so, it applies the philosophy of
the consolidated return regulations and of the theoretic approach stated
above. Such a strict rule would tightly restrict the transferability of
losses, which probably explains the terror Libson Shops inspired, and
the ensuing efforts to neutralize it.
40
In general, the two factor approach is workable even under present
legislation. It is most at variance with section 382(b), which permits
a loss transfer despite changes in the business, in the legal entity, and
in eighty per cent of the stock ownership. Section 382(b) is a product
of one-factor conceptualism 409 and therefore amendatory legislation
may be desirable. Section 382(a), however, does embody a two factor
approach: continuity of business and continuity of ownership. If that
section's criterion for determination of a change in ownership were
405 Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-31(b) (3) (1955).
406 But it is not clear that a sole proprietor may automatically offset losses
from one economic activity against profits from another. If the losses derived from
a "hobby farm," a different result might obtain. See note 342 supra.
407 Levine & Petta, supra note 358, argued that the only function of the continuity
of business test in Libson Shops was to decide whether the merged corporation was
the entity that sustained the premerger losses. However, the Supreme Court's opinion
appears to lay a broader emphasis on changes in business as an important factor in
determining the transferability of losses.
408 Tobolowsky, New Cases Limit Changes in Ozwnership and Operations That
Preserve Carryovers, 12 3. TAXATION 8 (1960), comments that in the drafting of the
regulations under § 382, consideration is currently being given by the Internal Revenue
Service to taking the position that Libson Shops requires that no transfer of a loss
carryover be permitted if a corporation changes from the garage to the laundry
business, even though there is no change of entity or ownership.
409 Note that the American Law Institute, in both its 1957-58 ALl REPoRT 50-51
and its 1958 ALl STruY 361-64. recommends percentage-of-ownership tests.
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redrafted so as to be more flexible and more workable, and if its defini-
tion of "purchase" were expanded so as to cover the type of transaction
involved in the loss bootstraps, it would be reconcilable with the two
factor formula. Section 269, as originally conceived, emphasized the
type of substance over form approach that lies behind the two factor
formula. The section is an application of one variant of the formula-
changes in ownership and business; as previously noted, however, re-
drafting is necessary to remove the language which has proven
vulnerable to judicial formalism.4 1
In summary, the two factor formula provides a clear solution for
all but one situation-the instance where the only change is in economic
activity. There, in theory, policy argues for the denial of transfer-
ability; short of that, the two factor formula provides a reasonable
compromise.
XII. Loss TRANSFERABILITY AND THE Loss BOOTSTRAPS
The Loss Bootstrap and the Various Approaches to Loss Transfers
The loss bootstraps do not seem to meet the requirements of any
of the major approaches to the transferability of loss carryovers, with
the obvious exception of the theory that carryovers may be freely
transferred. In the loss bootstrap situation, Profit Company is acquired
by a thinly capitalized corporation, newly organized by a group of loss
companies which are affiliated in the filing of a consolidated return and
which have large net operating losses. But the loss bootstrap, rather
than satisfying any two of the elements of the two factor formula, does
not, in substance, comply with any: there is no continuity of business,
entity, or ownership. Practically speaking, Loss Group is not currently
purchasing the profit business through its asset-poor subsidiary; nor,
in view of Owners' retention of ownership, will such a "purchase"
ordinarily be completed during the life of the loss carryovers. As
analysis of the bootstrap transaction has shown, Owners of Profit
Company are in substance purchasing Loss Group's carryovers at a
windfall price. Inasmuch as Owners have no ownership relation to
Loss Group, the losses will primarily be used by an entity and owners
other than those who incurred them. And the loss business is usually
liquidated, thus eliminating any continuity of business and arousing
those objections to the transfer of loss carryovers which center on
corporate concentration and unemployment."
410 See notes 371-75 supra and accompanying text.
411 See notes 390-92 supra.
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The transaction is equally in conflict with the approach that centers
on "tax avoidance" and with the somewhat related position that if tax
benefits are to be transferred, a fair and not disproportionate price shall
be paid. Inconsistency with the latter approach is shown by the windfall
price characteristic of the loss bootstrap. And the fact that Owners
do not even acquire a loss "shell," which acquisition itself would be
proscribed by section 129, but rather deal directly in the tax attributes
(the loss carryovers) is a significant manifestation of "tax avoidance."
Thus the loss bootstraps conflict with every major approach which seeks
to limit loss transfers.
The Relevance of Libson Shops Under the 1954 Code
If Libson Shops is interpreted as requiring a change in both
business and entity, the two factor formula incorporates the approaches
stated in both section 269 and in that case. But the clamor that arose
over the Supreme Court's decision in Libson Shops4 2 culminated with
the Commissioner's abandonment of the victory won 413 even though, at
most, it embodied the very philosophy set forth in his own consolidated
return regulations. Notwithstanding the fact that Libson Shops em-
phasized the term "the taxpayer" which appeared in old section 122 but
was deleted from section 172, it is reasonable to regard the case as
relevant under the 1954 Code, particularly if it is interpreted as requir-
ing changes in entity as well as business. The stricter position-that
only a change in business is required to deny the trdnsferability of losses
-though sound in theory, is more difficult to reconcile with the Code.
Sections 381 and 382 were primarily designed to eliminate the
confusion as to the role of the corporate entity concept. 414  They permit
a loss transfer Without compelling resort to fictions such as that a merger
412 See note 401 .mpra.
413 See Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 147; Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959 INT.
Rxv. BULL. No. 51, at 20. It is a further commentary on the contribution of the ad-
ministrative process to tax erosion that after the Commissioner won Libson Shops
in the Supreme Court, he was compelled to back down by pressures exerted by
groups representing the tax bar. Note, however, that some language in Rev. Rul.
59-395 implies that the Libsot Shops principles will be invoked at certain points under
the 1954 Code. This language probably reflects the refusal of the professional staff
to accept the complete abandonment of the Libson Shops principle. The last few lines
of the Revenue Ruling suggest that the Service may attempt to apply the continuity-
of-business doctrine under §§ 269 and 382(b), and to bear down heavily on the require-
ment of a "business purpose" for any reorganization transactions involving a loss
carryover. See note 408 supra.
414 S. Rxs'. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954). ". . . [W]hether or not the items carry-over should be
based upon economic realities, rather than upon such artifices as the legal form of
the reorganization . . . the new rules enable the successor corporation to step into
the 'tax shoes' of its predecessor corporation without necessarily conforming to arti-
ficial legal requirements which now exist under Court-made law . . . . The new
provision makes it difficult to escape the tax consequences of the law by means of a
legal artifice such as liquidation and reincorporation or merger into another corpo-
ration ... 
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corporation is the same entity as its predecessors, 415 and without con-
fronting the transfer with the contrasting rigidities of New Colonial
Ice or of Newmarket. But this elimination of the entity obstacle to loss
transfers hardly means that sections 381 and 382 dispense with the
continuity of ownership, the continuity of business, or the avoidance
tests.416 In any event, the two factor interpretation of Libson Shops
appears relevant to situations not specifically covered by sections 381
and 382, and this is perhaps also true of the view that only a change in
business is required to invoke the prohibitions of Libson Shops. By
either view, however, an application of Libson Shops. to the loss boot-
straps would deny deductions of loss carryovers: Loss Company's
business is liquidated 417 and there is a change in entity as well as
ownership. Revenue Ruling 58-603 418 only declines to apply Libson
Shops to only certain transactions under section 381 of the 1954
Code; .. and Revenue Ruling 59-395 420 makes this position more
specific. Even if Libson Shops were to be regarded as inapplicable, con-
tinuity of business remains relevant under either section 269 or the two
factor formula, just as it is for the direct application of section 382.
The Effect of Sections 269, 381 and 382
The 1954 legislation does not approve every loss transfer that is
not specifically barred by section 382. The enactment of section 269
indicates that some limitations on the transfer of losses outside of those
covered by sections 381 and 382 were intended-the fact that sections
381 and 382 significantly reduce the importance of the corporate entity
criterion in itself strengthens section 269. Cases by-passing section 269
relied primarily on the theory that the loss "belonged" to the corporate
entity or corporate shell. The legislative tests of loss transferability,
415 The fact that § 381 omits B and E reorganizations, which present no entity
problem, is further support for this view.
416 No separate "tax avoidance" test is necessary under the two factor formula.
By definition, any situation in which only one factor is retained involves "offsetting"
of income, and so tax avoidance.
417 MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2642 (1957) states that Botany Mills, Inc.
disposed of its last textile operation in 1955, not long after the acquisition.
418 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 147. Accord: Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959 INT. REv. BULL. No.
51, at 20. See note 413 supra.
419 The ruling states: "The principle announced [in Libson Shops] will not be
relied upon . . . under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as to a merger or any
other transaction described in section 381(a) of the 1954 Code. However, see sections
382(b) and 269 . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Presumably, therefore, wherever § 381
does not apply, Libson Shops is still available. It is typical of the orientation of most
tax literature that the commentators are virtually unanimous in rejecting with alarm
the thought that Libson Shops could be relevant under the 1954 Code. However,
even though the two Revenue Rulings cited in notes 413 and 418 sm¢pra are very
"liberal" with the revenues, it seems clear that the Commissioner will apply the Libson
Shops principle under the 1954 Code in a number of situations.
420 1959 INT. REV. BULL. No. 51, at 20.
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however, were not intended to be limited to the question of strict com-
pliance with sections 381 and 382. The legislative history indicates
that the Congressional purpose was to prevent the use of loss corpora-
tions "to offset gains of a business unrelated to that which produced the
losses" 421 and to prevent traffic in loss carryovers.422
However, many types of transactions were omitted from the
coverage of sections 381 and 382,423 or will escape their limitations be-
cause of the way those sections are drafted.424 Unless section 269 is
applied in the realistic manner of Coastal Oil and Mill Ridge, sections
381 and 382 may serve to forward the very dealings in loss shell cor-
porations that they purport to prevent.
Many of the section 381 and 382 (b) transfers involve reorganiza-
tion transactions, which must ordinarily reveal a "business purpose" to
be approved as reorganizations. 425  Therefore, it is appropriate to inter-
pret sections 381 and 382(b) as including a business purpose require-
ment; 426 such a view is also consistent with section 269.427 There will
still, however, be loss peddling situations not covered by either the
business purpose doctrine or the rather limited wording of section 269.
In such cases, a substance over form approach like the two factor
formula should be applicable. This is particularly true of the loss
bootstrap cases, which do not literally fall within sections 381 and
382. In form, a loss bootstrap is the acquisition of Profit Company by
Loss Group, a situation not covered by sections 381 and 382; in sub-
stance, Owners and Profit Company are purchasing, at a windfall
price, part of Loss Group's loss carryovers via New Company. Even
421S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954).
422 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954).
423E.g., B and E reorganizations; certain §332 liquidations; §351 formations;
consolidated return situations; and acquisitions of profit corporations by loss corpo-
rations.
424 For example: using preferred stock in order to meet the 20% continuity test
of § 382(b) ; achieving effective control through purchases below 50%; waiting two
years to change the business; purchasing 50% of the stock of a subsidiary, changing
its business, and then liquidating under § 332; purchasing 50% of the stock of a loss
corporation and 80% of the parent corporation and merging on a four-to-one share
basis; or acquiring a loss corporation through the issuance of small quantities of stock
followed by liquidation.
425 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
42 6 Against this view is the fact that certain § 332 liquidations are also included in
§§ 381 and 382(b). Ordinarily a "business purpose!' doctrine is not applied to such
liquidations.
427 But cf. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 284 (1954) : "If a limitation in
this section [§ 382] applies to a net operating loss carryover, section 269, relating to
acquisitions made to evade or avoid income tax, shall not also be applied to such net
operating loss carryover." This would make it possible to by-pass § 269 merely by
giving the old owners a 19Y2% interest whenever the transaction is covered by
§ 382(b). Section 382(b) reduces the available carryover by 5% for each per cent
that the retained interest of the old owners drops below 20%. Here, protection from
§ 269 could be obtained at a cost of only 231% of the total carryover. It is expected
that the Internal Revenue Service will disregard the suggestion, which is nevertheless
interesting as an example of an overt attempt to reshape legislation through the
unpublic processes of writing legislative history.
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by this analysis, the loss bootstrap still does not appear to be covered
by the limitations in section 382 as it is not a reorganization or other
type of transaction covered by section 382(b).428 Nor are the strictures
of section 382 (a) available, inasmuch as ordinarily fifty per cent of the
stock of Loss Group is not purchased.
Even section 269 does not appear to apply literally to those loss
bootstraps whose planners were careful not to acquire fifty per cent of
the stock of the Loss Companies. However, in view of the recent re-
jection of the Alprosa doctrine by British Motor Distribs., Coastal Oil
and Mill Ridge, it can be argued that when the Loss Group formed New
Company as a controlled subsidiary, it was thereby getting the "benefit"
of Loss Group's loss carryovers in a way otherwise unavailable. It can
also be contended that when New Company acquired over fifty per cent
of the stock of Profit Company, it thereby came within the Coastal Oil
interpretation of section 269. Furthermore, the total effect of the
transactions whereby Loss Group acquired New Company and New
Company acquired Profit Company is such as to come within the
coverage of section 269, particularly as Alprosa is no longer good
law.
429
Whether or not its formalities bring it within section 269, a loss
bootstrap is not the type of transfer specifically authorized by section
381, and sections 381 and 382 should not be interpreted to permit any
loss transfer to which they do not expressly apply, particularly where
the transfer is in violation of their claimed policy against dealing in
loss carryovers. This conclusion is in accord with the view that sec-
tions 381 and 382 were intended only to cure the problems posed by
the entity concept, and not to authorize the free transferability of losses.
The Loss Bootstraps and Consolidated Returns
Bootstrap Retention of Ownership
Under the consolidated return regulations,30 only affiliated groups
may have the privilege of filing consolidated returns. Section 1504(a)
428 See the discussion in Part I at 667-68, pointing out the inadequacy of de-
scribing the original bootstraps as "reorganizations." The loss bootstrap device
resembles the lease bootstrap in lacking a formal instrument readily subject to being
labeled "stock."
429 The approach to § 269 represented by Mill Ridge and Coastal Oil is increas-
ingly established in tax jurisprudence. The Tax Court in the recent case of British
Motor Distribs., 31 T.C. 437 (1959), reaffirmed all of the formal concepts of Alprosa,
including the "acquired-acquiring" dichotomy. Accord, Virginia Metal Prods., 33
T.C. 88 (1960). But see James Realty Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 306 (D.
Minn. 1959), which expressly declined to follow British Motor Distribs. and the
Ninth Circuit has now reversed the Tax Court in the latter case, CCH 1960 STAND.
FED. TAx REa. (60-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9417 (9th Cir. March 31, 1960), adopting the
Coastal Oil approach. The Tax Court position is increasingly isolated.
430 Treas. Reg. § 1.1504-1 (1955).
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defines an "affiliated group" as one or more chains of includable cor-
porations, eighty per cent of whose stock is owned directly by one or
more of the other corporations, and whose common parent corpo-
ration also owns directly at least eighty per cent of the stock of at
least one of the other includable corporations. The requirement of
direct ownership of eighty per cent of the stock for affiliation makes
explicit what is inherent in the privilege of filing consolidated returns:
a parent must have sufficient ownership of a subsidiary to ensure that
the group will have a degree of economic integration that justifies the
consolidation of returns. But the bootstrap analysis suggests that
Owners have retained so much of the ownership of Profit Company
that New Company cannot be seen as holding much more than a bare
legal title pending exhaustion of the loss carryovers. A holding that
such title or its equivalent constitutes the degree of ownership 431 neces-
sary for affiliation is inconsistent with the requirement of substantial
integration of parent and subsidiary that underlies the privilege of
consolidated returns, 432 and would facilitate tax avoidance because of
the opportunity for manipulation when a mere formality constitutes
"consolidation." But the principle has been frequently proclaimed that
the consolidated return regulations were not intended to facilitate tax
avoidance or to grant any tax advantage not otherwise available.438
431 In some loss bootstrap situations, the stock of the profit company is placed
in escrow pending the completion of the payments. Authorities are then cited which
state that putting stock in escrow, or making analogous arrangements such as trans-
ferring to a creditor's committee, is not inconsistent with possession of the ownership
necessary for affiliation. See Lavenstein Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 F.2d 375 (4th
Cir. 1928); Connecticut & Passumpsic Rivers R.R., 24 B.T.A. 394 (1931); Rev. Rul.
55-458, 1955-2 Cum. BuL. 579; G.C.M. No. 7331, VIII-2 Cum. BULL. 135 (1929);
A.R.R. No. 818, I-1 Cum. BULL. 296 (1922). Both Lavenstein and A.R.R. No. 818
state that in such circumstances there could be "affiliation!' even though "control" is
lacking. The inference is that since being in escrow or similar custody did not defeat
the necessary ownership for affiliation, it must be present. However, in these last situ-
ations, the language of the applicable statutes, § 240 of the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18,
40 Stat. 1081, and § 1331 of the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 138, 42 Stat. 319, read
"owned or controlled." (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, the other authorities which
discount the retention of control as a prerequisite for affiliation refer only to the
limited control involved in a transfer in escrow and not to the broad retention of
overall control over operations and management which is present in the bootstrap
situations. Moreover, the presence or absence of control is only part of the broader
question whether Owners, by retaining both the control and the risks of the business,
keep such beneficial ownership as to be inconsistent with the transfer to New
Company of the degree of ownership necessary for affiliation. The role of escrow
arrangements was considered because it is understood that this question was given
some weight by the Commissioner in initially issuing the group of favorable rulings
applicable to such loss bootstrap taxpayers as Botany Mills.
432 See generally PEEL, CONSOLiDATED TAX RETURNS (1959).
433 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1502; Rev. Rul. 57-201, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 295;
S. REP. No. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1928) ; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1932). In Olivier Co. v. Patterson, 151 F. Supp. 709, 715 (N.D. Ala. 1957), aff'd
per curiam, 249 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1958), the court remarked: "By filing a consolidated
return it [a corporate taxpayer] is not entitled to additional rights insofar as the loss
carryover provisions . . . are concerned."
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Business Purpose and Affiliation
Several decisions have held that affiliation will be denied where a
transaction lacks an independent business purpose.434 In these cases,
loss companies or companies owning high-basis, low-value assets were
acquired shortly prior to the filing of consolidated returns, and before
disposing of the high-basis assets at a loss. In American Pipe & Steel
Corp. v. Commissioner (where $400,000 in tax benefits was acquired
for $11,000) and in Elko Realty Co. v. Commissioner, section 129 was
invoked to deny affiliation. Spreckels Co. emphasized the general pur-
poses of the statute authorizing consolidated returns,435 by denying
affiliation where the acquisition of the subsidiary's stock was designed
only to utilize a pre-existing loss, rather than to achieve a valid business
objective.
While it may be argued that to forbid the bootstrap technique is to
discriminate against companies which lack resources for more conven-
tional financing, this argument overlooks the conflict between a boot-
strap transfer and the policies relevant to the retention of ownership
and the transfer of losses. The retention of ownership, the use of the
transaction to convert ordinary income into capital gains, the liquida-
tion of the loss business, the dealing in losses, the inflated price, and
the use of the old liquid assets for the down payments-all are factors
which indicate the lack of the business purpose necessary for affiliation.
Furthermore, to approve the loss bootstrap technique as a method of
financing small companies is to provide an indirect government subsidy
at the expense of the revenues-a subsidy not available to other small
businesses.
Loss Transfers and the Consolidated Regulations
The Commissioner has been given a high degree of discretion in
the drafting of the consolidated return regulations.430 It is perhaps
illustrative of the arguments for a greater administrative discretion in
tax matters (subject, of course, to adequate procedural safeguards 437)
that these regulations display an unusual degree of adherence to pro-
434 See Elko Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 1012, aff'd per curian, 260
F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1958); American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 351,
aff'd, 243 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957) ; Spreckels Co.,
41 B.T.A. 370 (1940). In Elko Realty, the court emphasized that the loss companies
had apparently been purchased without any real attempt to determine their market value
or to inquire into their actual earnings prospects, if any-a characteristic of the
bootstrap transaction.
435 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1501.
436 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1502.
437 See Lanning, Some Realities of Tax Reform, in 1959-1 TAx REwISlON Com-
PENDIUM 19.
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claimed tax principles. This they do by providing that the preaffiliation
losses of a corporation may be offset only against the postaffiliation in-
come of the economic unit that produced them.3 Decisions such as
Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose,439 which denied the right "to deduct the
losses that were suffered in earlier years when the companies were sep-
arate," foreshadowed the Libson Shops langauge that loss carryovers
were not intended to be used by enterprises separate from those that
incurred them"o and had a substantial influence on the development of
the consolidated return regulations.
This consistency with basic tax principles makes it easier to
analyze a loss transfer problem in a consolidated return setting. There
are, however, some inconsistencies: once a corporation is within the
consolidated group, it is assumed that the entire group of affiliated
corporations has achieved sufficient economic integration so that any
income or loss within the consolidated group may be mutually offset
without violating the basic principles just discussed. This assumption
is probably as doubtful as the somewhat similar assumption basic to the
loss transfer problem generally-that the close corporate entity has sig-
nificant economic reality. Just as use of the artificial legal entity re-
sulted in a deviation from the principle that income should be taxed
to the person who earns it, so the assumption of economic integration
within the confines of the consolidation produces a deviation from the
doctrine that losses should be offset only against the income of the
economic activity and the person that produced them. But at least
it is a deviation that is more manageable, more explicit, and perhaps
more rational than the confused variances in the loss transfer area
generally.
Bootstrap Use of Consolidated Returns
Consistent with the philosophy of the consolidated regulations that
all within the affiliated gr6up shall be treated as an integrated economic
enterprise, and that everything outside the group shall be seen as
appertaining to a different economic enterprise, a strict business con-
tinuity test is applied. Thus if a parent corporation with operating
losses acquires a subsidiary with profits, they may not thereafter file
a consolidated return and offset the income of the consolidated group
by losses which the parent had incurred in its separate return years.
Two decisions expressly hold this to be the correct interpretation of
438 See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1502-31 (a) (3) (i), -31(b) (3), -31(a) (3) (ii) (1955).
439286 U.S. 319, 330 (1932).
440 Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 389-90 (1957).
1960]
978 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the regulations 441 and so appear to reject directly any application of the
Alprosa doctrine to consolidated returns. The same result follows even
though there is no question of either tax avoidance or lack of business
purpose. How, then, was it possible for the Service to approve loss
bootstrap transactions under the consolidated return regulations, where
Loss Group's net operating losses were clearly incurred in tax years
prior to its affiliation in the filing of a consolidated return with Profit
Company and New Company?
The answer appears to lie in the Commissioner's assumption that
the consolidated regulations should be read with the same degree of
formalism that has been analyzed as a source of the erosion of sections
45 and 129 and the other tax doctrines fundamental to the bootstrap
technique. The regulations 442 provided that an affiliated group shall
be treated as remaining the "same" affiliated group so long as it re-
tains its common parent corporation and at least one of its subsidiaries.
In other words, the Loss Group is seen as remaining the "same"
affiliated group despite the addition of New Company and Profit
Company. Reading this in a completely literal way, the Loss Group
is seen as merely using its "own" prior losses within the boundaries of
the "same" affiliated group. Technically, then, there is no offsetting of
income or losses from separate return or different consolidated group
years. The planners of the loss bootstrap took advantage of this
administrative loophole by using an affiliated group of loss companies,
rather than a single loss corporation, to acquire the profit business. It
is difficult, however, to see what real difference it makes to the Loss
Group's ability to offset its prior losses against the postaffiliation in-
come of the newly acquired subsidiary that, at the time of the acquisi-
tion of the profit subsidiary, Loss Company had several other subsidi-
aries. It is still an offsetting of losses not incurred within the con-
solidated return year against the income of a corporation not affiliated
with the Loss Group when the losses were incurred.
The only rationale available to justify such a result is essentially
the Alprosa doctrine-an affiliated group is an entity, and as such is
specifically permitted by the consolidated return regulations to deduct
its own losses. However, there are several weaknesses in such an
argument. The regulations, Capital Services, Inc. v. Commissioner, and
Olivier Co. v. Patterson specifically reject the Alprosa doctrine in the
case of a single loss corporation using a consolidated return. Alprosa
itself is bad law in view of British Motor Distribs., Coastal Oil, Mill
441 Olivier Co. v. Patterson, 151 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Ala. 1957), aff'd per curiam,
249 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Capital Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 8 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 459 (1949), aff'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1950). Both per curam
decisions note that the circuit court was adopting the opinion below.
442 Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11(c) and (d) (1955).
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Ridge, and James Realty, and perhaps Elko Realty, Libson Shops, and
American Pipe and Steel.
Secondly, it is ordinarily held that an affiliated group is not itself
a tax entity, but merely a tax computing unit.443 The regulations sup-
port this conclusion in a number of ways: each member of a con-
solidated group is severally liable for the consolidated income tax;444
the common parent corporation is the agent of the group; ... a deficiency
notice names each company in the group; .. and levies and notice of
demand for payment all name the individual corporations.44
It may be argued that an affiliated group is an entity for loss
carryover purposes-that it is an economic if not a legal unit, and
that therefore it ought to be able to continue to use its own carryovers
whether or not the loss has occurred before the group was joined by a
corporation against whose income deduction of losses is sought. But
the argument is unsound. It facilitates tax avoidance and at least one
circuit court has rejected it. In Phinney v. Houston Oil Field Ma-
terial Co.,448 a consolidated net operating loss incurred primarily by
H corporation was not permitted to be carried back to a consolidated
return year when H corporation was not in existence. Yet this would
have been permitted if the consolidated group had any significant degree
of entity, for in that case it would merely be a question of the con-
solidated group using its own carryovers and carrybacks.
The fact that the regulations define as the same consolidated group
what is essentially a quite different group is not conclusive. That the
over-literal application of this definition to the loss carryover situation
results in the type of tax avoidance here present would seem to be a
defect in view of the authorities holding that the consolidated return
regulations may not be utilized to permit tax avoidance not possible in
their absence.449 Technically, when an affiliated group acquires addi-
tional subsidiaries, it may be the "same group" for some purposes under
the consolidated return regulations, but not for the purpose of per-
mitting the offsetting of preacquisition losses or income against post-
acquisition income or losses; a proper interpretation of the regulations
should be able to correct this loophole without any express amendment.
443 Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121 (1934); Woolford Realty Co. v.
Rose, 286 U.S. 319 (1932) ; Phinney v. Houston Oil Field Material Co., 252 F.2d 357
(5th Cir. 1958) ; Olivier Co. v. Patterson, 151 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Ala. 1957), aff'd
per curiam, 249 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Trinco Industries, Inc., 22 T.C. 959 (1954).
444 Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-15(a) (1955).
445 Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-16 (1955).
446Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-16(a) (1955).
447Ibid.
448 252 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1958).
449 See note 443 supra and accompanying text.
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However, as an elementary precaution, the regulations should be
amended to eliminate any possibility that this technique will continue
to be used.
An explanation of the failure of the Service to amend the regula-
tions even prospectively and of its failure to withdraw its rulings in
the loss bootstrap area may lie in the policy, adopted by the Treasury
in the past few years, that once the Internal Revenue Service has taken
a position favorable to a taxpayer or taxpayers and that position has
been outstanding for some period of time, any error which it involves
may no longer be corrected by the Service itself, but only by legislative
action. 5 This attitude often has the practical result of making any
error of the Service a permanent one.
XIII. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Loss Bootstraps and Charitable Bootstraps
All bootstrap transactions pose the issue of retention of ownership.
A crucial issue for the charitable bootstraps was that of private inure-
ment; the corresponding issue for the loss bootstraps is the offsetting of
X's losses against Y's income. Although private inurement was dis-
tinctive as an area in which the courts enforced proclaimed tax
principles, this did not prove sufficient in the original bootstrap litiga-
tion.451  There the courts made a formal finding that a "sale" had
occurred, and so refused to recognize the presence of private inurement.
The policies and the pattern of decision in favor of limiting loss trans-
fers are considerably less restrictive than those relating to private
inurement. If the private inurement argument was not decisive in the
original bootstrap cases, the far weaker policies against loss transfer
are unlikely to win recognition in the loss bootstrap area.
Erosion and the Taxing Process
This study has emphasized the judicial role in tax erosion. Even
so, it has been evident that erosion also proceeds from all other
phases of the taxing process, and the loss bootstrap device is a good
450 This policy is often enunciated and applied within the Internal Revenue Service
and the Treasury and is a matter of common knowledge to the tax bar, if not to the
general public.
451 In this connection it should be noted that the Commissioner has apparently
conceded defeat on the original bootstraps; the nonacquiescences in Estate of Howes
and Truschel have been withdrawn and replaced by acquiescences. 1960 INT. REV. BuLL.
No. 6, at 8. It is possible that this action may affect the Commissioner's position in all
bootstrap litigation. It appears to be an example of undue eagerness to yield on an
embattled position; if the Commissioner had similarly abandoned §§ 129-269, the
recent victories would never have ensued.
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illustration of each. The judicial erosion, exemplified by the treatment
of section 129, the Alprosa doctrine, and the general transferability of
losses, form one important link. Another is administrative erosion,
evidenced by the formalism with which the consolidated regulations
were interpreted and by the favorable rulings issued in the Botany
Mills transactions. And the legislative erosion revealed by the 1954
legislation on loss transfers completes the loss bootstrap chain. The
original bootstrap illustrated these various phases of erosion in even
greater detail.
No legislation would be needed to deal with the bootstrap problem
if any one of a number of proclaimed principles-such as no private
inurement, the need for a substantial shift in ownership prior to capital
gains treatment, the principle of section 129-were given real effect by
the taxing process. But the basic need to improve the process itself
does not mean that it is unimportant to strengthen existing substantive
legislation; the form and content of legislation is one of the important
variables in the erosion of our system of progressive taxation.
Statutory Solutions
The multiplication of bootstrap devices, and the failure of the
courts to come to grips with the problem, suggests that the Commis-
sioner will soon have to seek legislation in the area. This may be both
difficult and delicate, for the bootstrap cases are composed of a number
of elements, some of which may not be objectionable in themselves.
Businesses are often sold, the sellers are sometimes asked to stay on as
managers, corporate earnings may be the source of payments, thin
capitalizations may be employed, the price may be inflated, and so on.
It is the entire transaction, as an integrated whole, that must be dealt
with. The difficulty lies in drafting legislation which will encompass the
component elements of the bootstraps without interfering with normal
business transactions. For example, it would not be practicable to
enact legislation forbidding the former owners of a business to continue
to operate it; business practice is much the other way. Nor would a
blanket prohibition on the use of corporate earnings to meet the
purchase price of a business be feasible in the light of current security
and financing practices.
A statute might be drafted which would describe the various boot-
straps in detail and deny to them capital gains treatment and the use of
tax-exempt funds by exemption or carryover. Specific provisions on
retention of ownership, however, might cause difficulty due to the
problems noted above. Part of the solution might be a broad statute,
similar to section 45 of the 1939 Code, giving the Commissioner the
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power to deny capital gains treatment wherever so much ownership is
retained as to be inconsistent with the existence of an economically
meaningful transfer. This general statute could be supplemented by
specific substantive changes in the law, which might include: an amend-
ment of the exemption statutes to make it clear that "rental" transac-
tions could not be used to shield the receipt of business income; an
amendment of the unrelated business income provisions to eliminate
the unwarranted exclusion of churches (a source of future bootstrap
transactions); and a provision to meet the problem of splitting up
"passive" and "active" income."' A revision of the statutory concepts
of "unreasonable accumulation" and "prohibited transaction" along the
lines of the original 1950 proposals of the House of Representatives
would tighten up this last area.
A provision that all "debt" be treated as "equity" in the hands
of a shareholder of a close corporation, while sustainable in theory, goes
further than is currently practicable. A statutory adoption of the
economic interest approach as a limitation on capital gains treatment
would help to restrict most of the bootstrap abuses. This also, how-
ever, is hardly likely at present, in view of the "substantial rights"
approach of section 1235."'
Sections 45 and 129 (now sections 482 and 269) should be re-
drafted to eliminate the language that proved vulnerable in litigation,
and sections 381 and 382 should be drafted so as to place effective limits
on loss peddling. The two factor formula would appear to offer a
minimum limitation on loss transfers, although the more restrictive
theoretic approach described above is preferable. In either event, the
economic loss limitation should be restored. And there should be
amendment of the consolidated return regulations to eliminate the
special treatment of loss groups for loss transfer purposes.
Basic Solutions
One cannot just wave a legislative wand and force judges and
other tax decision makers to abandon the ways of formalism. But
improvement can be sought 454 both in the long and in the short range.
The effect of much of the formalism here considered-of the legal
myths ranging from the capital gains doctrine and the "destination
test," through the judicial treatment of sections 45 and 129 and sales
452 See Amon G. Carter Foundation v. United States, 58-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. 9342
(N.D. Tex. 1958) ; Part I at 684-85, 688-89.
453 See Part I at 659-60.
454 See Lanning, Some Realities of Tax Reform, 1959 TAx REVIsION COMPENDIUM
19, where some possible answers to tax erosion are outlined in a general survey of
tax reform.
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and leasebacks, to the thin capitalization doctrine and the original boot-
straps themselves-has been to rationalize tax relief for particular
groups of taxpayers. One potent weapon against the myth that such
doctrines serve a broad public interest rather than the interest of a
particular group is rational inquiry, with the necessary factual informa-
tion to support it. Part of the answer to tax erosion lies in a broader
dissemination of information as to what actually goes on within the
taxing process-who is really bearing the burden of taxation, and how,
and why.455 All tax erosion, however, cannot be attributed to lack of
information. Many tax decision makers are aware of the erosive effect
of decisions granting tax relief in particular instances. The answers
must lie deeper, both in the institutions of the taxing process and,
beyond that, in more fundamental political forces.
Part of the answer to judicial formalism lies in an improvement of
the calibre of the judicial system. This would require a greater em-
phasis on merit and ability in the selection of judges, more judges and
law clerks, and better salaries. And reform of the judicial portion of the
taxing process depends also on correction of the institutional factors
noted in Part I, such as the inadequate use of certiorari by the Supreme
Court 456 and the advantage held by those taxpayers able to afford resort
to the uneven refund jurisdiction of the district courts and juries and
the Court of Claims.457 These deficiencies can be corrected by im-
proving the calibre of the judiciary, or perhaps by placing exclusive tax
jurisdiction in the Tax Court and a Court of Tax Appeals.
A disturbing aspect of the erosion attributable to the judicial,
legislative, and administrative portions of the taxing process is that it
is symptomatic of deviation from democratic ways. The legislature
tends to represent narrow sectional interests rather than to promote
broad public welfare. Due to the nature of our political parties, the
455 A revived Treasury program of issuing research documents on important tax
problems and otherwise communicating tax information to the public, and a broader
permission for government personnel to write and speak on such problems, would help
to meet this need. If more tax literature were directed towards the public interest
instead of the omnipresent "tax planning" advice, public enlightenment would be
increased. And a greater emphasis in the law schools on the policy implications of
legal doctrine would help lay the groundwork.
450 Note the denial of certiorari in such important cases as Chamberlin v. Com-
missioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954) (stock
bailout); United States v. Community Servs., Inc., 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 932 (1952) (charitable feeder) ; Brown v. Commissioner, 180
F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950) (sale and leaseback). On the
other hand, certiorari was granted in such less crucial cases as Commissioner v.
Peurifoy, 358 U.S. 59 (1958) (travel away from home), and United States v. Hulley,
358 U.S. 66 (1958) (tax liens). For a more extended discussion of the Court's use
of certiorari, see Lanning, vepra note 454.
457 See Pavenstedt, The United States Court of Clains as a Forum for Tax
Cases (pts. 1-2), 15 TAx L. REv. 1, 8 n.27, 10 n.28, 201 (1959-60); Lanning, mtpra
note 454.
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lack of an item veto, and the effect of the seniority rule in Congress, the
President, who alone is nationally elected, frequently lacks the power
to obtain legislation in the public interest. In tax administration,
bureaucracy-the tendency to put first the interests of a dominant
group of administrators-has contributed to the erosion. If the taxing
process is to serve a broadly conceived public interest, these institutions
must be in the hands of those who set that as their goal.
A few final thoughts on the broad problem of tax erosion and tax
reform as revealed by the bootstrap transactions. Democracy is based
on the dignity of the individual and the right of all to enjoy maximum
opportunity for self-expression. As such, it requires a production and
sharing of the values which most humans prefer, including wealth,
power, well-being, and enlightenment; progressive taxation is one of
many important weapons for keeping disparities of wealth and power
within the limits which seem necessary to the healthy functioning of a
democratic society. Yet the tax erosion noted here consists primarily
of special tax treatment accorded to select groups. Only a small number
of taxpayers, for instance, benefit by capital gains treatment or percent-
age depletion. It is not true that the only nhethod of priming our
economic machinery is through a set of special incentives to a small
group of investors; there are many other fiscal measures, including
budgetary and monetary policies, that can be used to further growth
and stability. To emphasize unduly investment incentives is simply
to rationalize the shifting of the tax burden from the upper bracket
taxpayer to the public generally. But this some courts have been willing
to do, through a formalistic judicial erosion characterized by the failure
to apply perceptive methods of inquiry to legal problems. Such narrow
conceptualism is inconsistent with the emphasis on complete and
rational inquiry that is vital to any democratic society.
Briefly then, the answer to growing tax erosion lies not only in
better drafted legislation and the closing of loopholes, but ultimately
in the cumulative, complex, and slow process of broadening and
strengthening our democracy.
